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Arkansas, Meet Tarasoff: The Question of
Expanded Liability to Third Persons for Mental
Health Professionals
J. Thomas Sullivan∗
Lawyers are typically asked why they are able to represent people
who are guilty of committing crimes.
Mental health
professionals, in contrast, appear to be subjected to questioning
about why they did not figure out that their patients were about
to commit crimes—typically the issue arises only with violent
crimes—and why they didn’t manage to stop them.

I. INTRODUCTION
The seemingly increasing frequency of mass shooting
episodes classified as mass murder has focused media and
political attention on the likely causes of random violence and its
causes. 1 Typically, consideration of the causes of these incidents
∗
Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law, Adjunct
Professor of Law and Psychiatry, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences. See
Psychiatric Defenses in Arkansas Criminal Trials, 48 ARK. L. REV. 439 (1995) and The
Culpability, or Mens Rea, Defense in Arkansas, 53 ARK. L. REV. 805 (2000). I would like to
acknowledge the generous contributions made to the Law and Psychiatry course offered at
the Law School by Drs. Robert Forrest and Raymond Molden, Board Certified Forensic
Psychiatrists, and by other practitioners and members of the UAMS Department of
Psychiatry faculty and mental health practitioners over the past two decades of my
involvement with this course, including Drs. Daryl Matthews, Albert Kittrell, Alan Newman,
Ben Guise, Stacy Simpson, Jeremy Hinton, Courtney Rocha, and others who have presented
individual lectures in this course. I also acknowledge the generous financial assistance
provided by the UALR Bowen School of Law in underwriting the research and writing of
this article. This paper was the basis for my presentation at the Annual Meeting of the
Arkansas Psychiatric Society on the topic “Risk Management,” held July 30, 2016, in Little
Rock. Copyright 2016, by the author.
1. See 1000 Mass Shootings in 1230 Days: This Is What America’s Gun Crisis Looks
Like, THE GUARDIAN (June 14, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/nginteractive/2015/oct/02/mass-shootings-america-gun-violence?CMP=fb_gu
[https://perma.cc/WMC3-BXDW]. In response to the mass shooting at a nightclub in
Orlando, Florida, that occurred on June 13, 2016, The Guardian reported the following:
Sunday’s attack on the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida was the deadliest
mass shooting in American history—but there were five other mass shootings
in the US during that weekend alone. “We have a pattern now of mass
shootings in this country that has no parallel anywhere else in the world,”
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has been directed toward evidence of mental illness or
impairment of perpetrators and prior psychiatric treatment or
counseling. 2 More recently, international terrorism has proved a
significant concern, although domestic terrorism remains an
important potential source of motivation for these acts.
The concern for the motivation of perpetrators will likely
continue to be an important issue and subject of national debate
with respect to prevention, perhaps a matter that will not abate at
any point in the future. For Arkansas mental health providers, the
question of a therapist’s duty to take appropriate action based on
disclosure of a patient’s threat to commit an act of violence is now
framed in terms of two significant, fairly recent legal events. 3
First, in 2013, the General Assembly passed legislation
extending immunity for mental health providers considering
potential response to patient threats beyond the previous statutory
immunity for those providers—and others—involved in initiating
emergency involuntary commitment proceedings. 4 Second, in a

Barack Obama said after the San Bernardino attack in December 2015. Data
compiled by the [Gun Violence Archive] reveals a shocking human toll: there
is a mass shooting—defined as four or more people shot in one incident, not
including the shooter—on five out of every six days, on average.
Id.
2. Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth T. MacLeish, Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and
the Politics of American Firearms, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240, 240 (2015).
3. See generally Rebecca Johnson, Govind Persad & Dominic Sisti, The Tarasoff Rule:
The Implication of Interstate Variation and Gaps of Professional Training, 42 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHOL. & L. 469 (2014) (evaluating efficacy of duties imposed on mental health
professionals, after the landmark Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. rulings, to warn
intended victims of potential violence by patients and noting flaws in warning protocol based
on lack of national and professional uniformity in approach).
4. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-45-201 to -202 (2014). The Act characterized its intent in
terms of the duty to warn of threatened patient violence. House Bill 1746 was entitled: “AN
ACT TO REQUIRE A MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES PROVIDER TO WARN A LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OF A CREDIBLE THREAT BY A PATIENT; AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.” Act 1212, 2013 Ark. Acts 4964, 4964. Its subtitle was: “TO
REQUIRE A MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES PROVIDER TO WARN A LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OF A CREDIBLE THREAT BY A PATIENT.” Id. In fact,
the Act does not impose liability for failure to warn of credible threat of patient violence, but
expands immunity for those mental health providers who notify law enforcement agencies
in the county in which the intended victim or the patient resides, or notify the Arkansas State
Police of the threat, or who otherwise arranges for voluntary or involuntary civil commitment
of the patient. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-45-202(b). Nor does the Act expressly create a cause
of action for failure to warn, but its language, by implication, recognizes the viability of a
cause of action based on a failure of a designated mental health provider to warn of the
credible threat. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-45-202.
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recent decision, Fleming v. Vest, 5 the Arkansas Court of Appeals
recognized a cause of action under state law against mental health
professionals 6 for injuries sustained by third persons resulting
from acts of violence committed by their patients. 7 In a very real
sense, these two developments are interrelated, but the second is
likely the more pressing, theoretically, for practitioners.

II. LIABILITY FOR INJURY SUSTAINED BY THIRD
PARTIES
The decision in Fleming v. Vest 8 represents a substantial
change in Arkansas medical malpractice law, or at least in its
application. For decades, mental health providers were protected
from liability to third parties by the doctrine of privity for their
claimed acts of malpractice . 9
The privity doctrine generally limits liability of parties based
on proof of contractual relationships designed to protect those
whose actions are distinguishable from other actors whose

5. 2015 Ark. App. 636, 475 S.W.3d 576.
6. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-114-201 to -212 (2016 & Supp. 2015).
7. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 5, 475 S.W.3d at 580. Perhaps surprisingly, the
majority opinion does not directly address the issue of liability to third parties. Instead, this
issue is entangled in the discussion of other issues, including the applicability of the Medical
Malpractice Act and its two year statute of limitations. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203(a).
Instead, Judge Harrison, in his concurring opinion actually opens the door to the fundamental
question of liability for claims made by third parties:
What duty, if any, did Dr. Vest owe to Fleming under the circumstances? That
is the fighting issue in this case, and courts have split over this question since
the seminal case Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California.
Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 13, 475 S.W.3d at 584.
8. See id. at 636, 475 S.W.3d at 576.
9. John G. Crivelli, Tort Law: Florida Takes Another Step Towards Abandoning the
Professional Privity Requirement: Pat v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995), 47 FLA. L.
REV. 641, 643 (1995). The Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, which governs actions
against medical providers for negligence, includes the following definition for “medical care
provider”:
“Medical care provider” means a physician, certified registered nurse
anesthetist, physician’s assistant, nurse, optometrist, chiropractor, physical
therapist, dentist, podiatrist, pharmacist, veterinarian, hospital, nursing home,
community mental health center, psychologist, clinic, or not-for-profit home
healthcare agency licensed by the state or otherwise lawfully providing
professional medical care or services, or an officer, employee or agent thereof
acting in the course and scope of employment in the providing of such medical
care or medical services.
ARK. CODE ANN. §16-114-201(2).

990

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:987

liability is obvious. 10 For example, under Arkansas law, privity
was fostered at one time by a principle in contract actions in
which a party performing work on contract with another entity
was not liable for defects in the work performed once it had been
accepted by the contracting party. 11 In Sunneson v. Holloway
Constr. Co., 12 the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the
problem where a plaintiff sustained an injury resulting in a broken
neck and total paralysis when his loaded tractor-trailer left the
highway due to a contractor’s negligence.
The construction performed was under contract with the
Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department and this
contractual relationship establishing privity between the
Department and contractor. 13 Once the Department accepted the
work performed under the contract, the “accepted-work” rule left
Suuneson without a cause of action against the contractor that
negligently performed substandard work. 14 But, any civil action
against the Department based on the negligent performance of the
construction contract would be barred by the “sovereign
immunity” provision of the state constitution. 15
The supreme court explained that the restriction upon
recovery from the contractor was predicated on the fact that the
contractor was not in privity with the injured party since it was
contractually obligated only to the contracting party, the
Department. Surveying the abandonment of the “accepted-work”
doctrine in a substantial number of jurisdictions, 16 the court
repudiated the bar to liability to injured third parties:
From our review of the substantial legal authority on the
subject, we believe the better-reasoned view is that the
accepted-work doctrine is both outmoded and often
unnecessarily unfair in its application. We believe it would
be a mistake to continue to apply a doctrine based upon
10. David F. Tavella, Is Privity Dead? Should It Be?, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 505, 505
(2012).
11. See Memphis Asphalt & Paving Co. v. Fleming, 96 Ark. 442, 443-44, 132 S.W.
222, 222 (1910).
12. See 337 Ark. 571, 573, 579-82, 992 S.W.2d 79, 80, 83-85 (1999).
13. Id. at 573, 992 S.W.2d at 80.
14. Id. at 574, 992 S.W.2d at 80.
15. ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20.
16. Sunneson, 337 Ark. at 581, 992 S.W.2d at 84 (“[T]he accepted-work doctrine is
based on a privity-of-contract theory, which is a concept that has become virtually extinct in
American jurisprudence, at least to the extent privity had been recognized earlier in the
product-liability context.”).
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privity of contract when the third party’s injury is
foreseeable. 17

A. Application of the Privity Doctrine to Professional
Negligence Claims
In Chatman v. Millis, 18 a 1975 decision of the Arkansas
Supreme Court, the privity doctrine was applied to reject the
argument that a psychologist’s claimed negligence demonstrated
a cause of action under Arkansas law. The psychologist offered
an opinion as to a father’s claimed propensity to commit acts of
homosexual abuse with the minor child who was the subject of an
apparently bitter visitation dispute. 19 The opinion was included
in a letter sent to the mother’s attorney to support her action for
termination of the father’s parental rights. 20
The supreme court acknowledged that under state law an
action for malpractice against a psychologist may exist, though it
declined to rule on this point expressly:
It is not necessary, in determining this litigation, to pass on
the question of whether there is a cause of action in Arkansas
for malpractice available against a psychological examiner
or psychologist, since we are of the view that, even though
such a cause of action exists, the allegations of appellant’s
complaint do not state a cause of action. 21

Instead, the court held that even with the existence of a cause
of action for malpractice, Chatman could not state a claim for
relief because the privity doctrine precluded recovery. This was
made clear in the majority’s holding:
We do not flatly state that a cause for malpractice must be
predicated upon a contractual agreement between a doctor
(psychologist) and patient, but we do say that a doctorpatient relationship must exist, i.e., there must be a duty, as

17. Id. at 582, 992 S.W.2d at 84 (emphasis added). This statement reflects the tradition
of privity as a concept arising in contract or property law and its relationship to torts, which
focuses not on identity or ownership interest, but on duty owed to third parties not in privity
with those in the contractual relationship or who may share ownership interests in property,
or property rights. Goodrich, Herbert F., Privity of Contract and Tort Liability, 21 MICH. L.
REV. 200, 200-203 (1922).
18. See 257 Ark. 451, 453, 517 S.W.2d 504, 506 (1975).
19. Id. at 452, 517 S.W.2d at 505.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 453, 517 S.W.2d at 506.
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a doctor, owed from the practitioner to the patient. Under
the allegations before us, Millis made no examination of
Chatman; in fact, he did not even know Chatman, and had
never seen him. Appellant was not a patient of Millis, and
the diagnosis reached was not for the benefit of Chatman.
Even if the findings of the psychologist were negligently
made, Chatman did not rely upon this diagnosis to his
detriment. 22

The majority thus based its holding on the application of the
privity of contract doctrine to preclude recovery on an action
brought by a third party claiming injury as a result of the mental
health professional’s negligence in failing to make an accurate
diagnosis, reiterating: “[Millis] owed no duty, as a doctor, to
[Chatman], and this duty must be in existence before [Chatman]
can recover because of negligence, constituting malpractice.” 23
Justice Fogelman issued a compelling dissent, arguing “[t]he
majority’s result has imported a rule of privity into malpractice
actions. I consider this not only undesirable but improper.” 24 His
discussion of the history of the litigation revealed it to be
confused, 25 stressing the need to initially resolve the question of
whether a malpractice action may lie against a professional,
noting that Arkansas decisions had previously recognized that
professionals could be held liable for negligence in performance
of the standards governing their respective professions,

22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Chatman, 257 Ark. at 454, 517 S.W.2d at 506. Chatman also alleged that Millis’
diagnosis that Chatman had engaged in homosexual, incestuous conduct with his two-anda-half-year-old son constituted defamation under Arkansas law. Id. at 451-52, 517 S.W.2d
at 505. However, Arkansas law required that an action for defamation must be brought in
the county of the defendant’s residence; Chatman brought his action for malpractice and
defamation in White County, rather than Jackson County, where Millis resided and the
defamation count was dismissed. Id. at 452-53, 517 S.W.2d at 505. The specific allegations
concerning Millis’ diagnosis and claimed defamation were not included in the majority
opinion, but in Justice Fogelman’s dissenting opinion. Id. at 455, 517 S.W.2d at 506
(Fogelman, J., dissenting). Thus, ironically, Chatman was victimized twice by professional
negligence, that of Millis, the psychologist, and his own attorney, who failed to file the
defamation action in the correct court.
24. Id. at 458, 517 S.W.2d at 509.
25. See Chatman, 257 Ark. at 455-58, 517 S.W.2d at 506-08. For example, Justice
Fogelman noted that in moving to quash the complaint based on the plaintiff’s failure to file
the defamation action in the county of the defendant’s residence, the trial court had treated
that claim as warranting dismissal as to malpractice claim, as well. Id. at 455-56, 517 S.W.2d
at 507. He pointed out: “[Defendant Millis] did not then allege and has never contended he
could not be liable for malpractice.” Id.
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addressing the finding of the trial court that “there can be no cause
of action against a psychological examiner or psychologist.” 26
Justice Fogelman then proceeded to address the question of
malpractice in terms of the core doctrines of tort law, duty and
foreseeability:
A malpractice action, however it may be necessary to define
it in order to give recognition to factors peculiar to the
practice of a profession, should be considered nothing more
or less than a tort action to recover damages for either willful,
ignorant or negligent misconduct of a practitioner in the
practice of his profession. 27

He then reasoned that the duty owed by a psychologist to a
third person would arise in circumstances in which it was
reasonably foreseeable that his professional negligence would
cause injury to a third person. 28
Justice Fogelman concluded that Chatman had stated a cause
of action against Millis for professional negligence—
malpractice—in opining that Chatman was a homosexual:
Assuming the allegations of the complaint to be true, as we
must, it would border on absurdity to say that appellee could
not reasonably have foreseen that a misdiagnosis of
homosexuality would harm appellant. The fact that the
26. Justice Fogelman first noted the following:
Malpractice has been defined as “[a]ny professional misconduct, unreasonable
lack of skill or fidelity in professional or fiduciary duties, evil practice, or
illegal or immoral conduct.” Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.) 1111. In
Arkansas, malpractice has been recognized as negligence in the practice of
various professions, among which are law, medicine, and dentistry. See
Welder v. Mercer, 247 Ark. 999, 448 S.W.2d 952; Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark.
58, 70 S.W.2d 503; Black v. Bearden, 167 Ark. 455, 268 S.W. 27. In the last
of the cited cases we held that the rules governing duties and liabilities of
physicians and surgeons applied to practice of kindred branches of the healing
arts. Our statutes make the practice of psychology a profession of the healing
arts. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 72-1501-72-1518 (Repl. 1957) deal with this
profession.
Id. at 456-57, 517 S.W.2d at 507.
27. Id. at 459, 517 S.W.2d at 509.
28. Id. at 460, 517 S.W.2d at 510. Justice Fogelman wrote the following:
Chief Judge [J. Smith] Henley had demonstrated that Arkansas cases hold that
a duty to use care arises when it is reasonably foreseeable that injury will
probably result to another if care is not used and that it depends upon the
foreseeability of injury or damage, not upon privity of contract. Rhoads v.
Service Machinery Company, 329 F. Supp. 367 (D.C.Ark.1971).
Id.
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diagnosis was made without appellee’s having known, seen
or interviewed appellant or having administered any tests to
him would seem, in and of itself, to be malpractice, but
whether it is or not is a matter of evidence when the case is
tried on its merits. 29

For Judge Fogelman, the diagnosis of the plaintiff without a
personal examination or evaluation by Millis likely amounted to
professional negligence, although he recognized this was still an
issue for jury determination at trial. 30
In Justice Fogelman’s view, the majority’s focus on the
absence of the doctor/patient relationship as defeating the cause
of action 31 reflected a discredited limitation on the basic principle
in tort law that the foreseeability of injury to a third person would
serve to establish the duty of the tortfeasor toward that third
person not to engage in the act likely to cause the injury,
prompting him to quip, “The ‘privity requirement’ was gasping
its last breath in Arkansas prior to today’s decision.” 32
Chatman v. Millis has not been expressly overruled to date
and was cited with approval by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in
Thompson v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr. in 2009: “The broad holding
of Chatman is that a medical provider owed no duty to a person
who was not its patient.” 33 Chatman was cited by Judge Harrison
in his concurring opinion in Fleming v. Vest, 34 but neither he nor
the majority judges 35 even suggested their respective approaches
29. Id. at 465-66, 517 S.W.2d at 512.
30. Chatman, 257 Ark. at 465-66, 517 S.W.2d at 512.
31. Id. at 466, 517 S.W.2d at 512-13.
32. Id. at 463, 517 S.W.2d at 511. Interestingly, the privity requirement is retained by
statute for actions commenced against accountants and attorneys in Arkansas. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (2006), Accountant Liability; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-303
(2006), Attorney Liability. Both statutes expressly provide that liability for negligence can
only be maintained by clients in privity of contract with their accountants or attorneys. Id.
However, that the respective professional’s duty of care may be extended to third persons
when “[the] primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit or
influence the particular person bringing the action.” See id. Under these statutes, a third
person not in privity of contract with the accountant or attorney whose negligence damages
the interests of the third person for whom the performance of professional services was
expressly intended may recover against the accountant or attorney or their firms for
malpractice. See id.; see also Kowalski v. Rose Drugs of Dardanelle, Inc., 2011 Ark. 44, at
18-19, 378 S.W.3d 109, 120-21 (holding pharmacy not liable to third person for filling
prescriptions ordered by patient’s physician leading to patient’s death from overdose
rejecting claim that pharmacies owe a duty to monitor physician prescription decisions).
33. 2009 Ark. App. 190, at 5, 355 S.W.3d 35, 38.
34. 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 10, 12-13, 475 S.W.3d, 582-84 (Harrison, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 1, 10, 475 S.W.3d at 578, 582 (Brown, J., joined by Abrahamson, J.).
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in Fleming required that Chatman be re-examined. Instead, Judge
Harrison would have relied on Chatman’s requirement for privity
in order to exclude this action from coverage under the Arkansas
Medical Malpractice Act. 36

B. Tarasoff: Patient Threats and the Duty to Warn
The California Supreme Court’s decision in Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 37 has achieved iconic status in the law
of torts. 38 The court concluded that mental health professionals
at the health center at the UC Berkeley campus could be held
liable for failing to warn the intended victim of a patient’s threats
of violence. 39 The victim, Tatiana Tarasoff, was the ex-girlfriend
of the patient, Poddar, who had threatened to kill her once she
returned from her summer vacation in Brazil for the new school
year. 40
The psychologist to whom Poddar’s threat was
communicated apparently concluded that the threat was credible
because he notified campus police, who stopped Poddar, but did
not take him into custody after talking with him. 41 Thereafter, the
treating psychologist was directed by his supervisor at the mental
health clinic action not to take any further action 42 and the

36. Id. at 12-14, 475 S.W.3d at 583-85.
37. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) [hereinafter Tarasoff II] (en banc). The en banc decision
followed an initial decision, Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974)
[hereinafter Tarasoff I] (en banc), in which a six-judge panel had also concluded that the
treating psychologist had a duty to warn a third person of a patient’s threat to commit an act
of violence specifically identifying that person as the intended target of the threat. But see
id. at 565 (Clark, J., dissenting) (arguing that the duty of confidentiality owed to the patient
should not be compromised by a duty to report a threat to an intended victim whose identity
has been disclosed by the patient).
38. See, e.g., PAUL BATEMAN, TEN INSTRUCTIONS FOR BRIEFING CASES 12 (2003),
http://www.swlaw.edu/pdfs/briefingcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/GAB3-MJUY] (Professor
Bateman noted that “even in Torts, some cases do take on ‘name brand’ status as with
Tarasoff, the California decision that provides an exception to doctor-patient
confidentiality.”).
39. Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 353.
40. On direct appeal from Poddar’s conviction for murder, the intermediate appellate
court noted in its opinion that “three psychiatrists and one clinical psychologist agreed that
appellant suffered from chronic schizoid paranoia.” People v. Poddar, 103 Cal. Rptr. 84, 86,
93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). The state supreme court subsequently reversed Poddar’s conviction
and the appellate court’s decision in finding that the trial court committed prejudicial error
in instructing the jury on implied malice, remanding the case for new trial. People v. Poddar,
518 P.2d 342, 344 (Cal. 1974).
41. Tarasoff I, 529 P.2d at 554-55.
42. Id.
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Tarasoff court tersely observed, “No one warned Tatiana of her
peril.” 43
Tatiana’s parents sued the treating psychologist, supervising
psychiatrists and other psychiatrists employed by the University
who concurred in the decision not to pursue involuntary
commitment of Poddar, and the University police who released
Poddar after briefly detaining him. 44 The civil suit was based on
two basic theories, the failure of the mental health professionals
to warn Tatiana of the danger believed to be posed by Poddar and
their failure to take appropriate steps to initiate emergency
proceedings for the civil commitment of Poddar. 45 The court
succinctly addressed the scope of its decision:
We shall explain that defendant therapists, merely because
Tatiana herself was not their patient, cannot escape liability
for failing to exercise due care to warn the endangered
Tatiana or those who reasonably could have been expected
to notify her of her peril.
When a doctor or a
psychotherapist, in the exercise of his professional skill and
knowledge, determines, or should determine, that a warning
is essential to avert danger arising from the medical or
psychological condition of his patient, he incurs a legal
obligation to give that warning. 46

Thus, the California Supreme Court initially rejected
reliance on the concept of privity of contract to limit liability of
mental health professionals to third persons that the Chatman
court applied to deny liability under Arkansas law. The court then
expressly recognized the mental health professional’s affirmative
duty to warn third persons of credible threat under state law. 47
The court also noted an interesting aspect of the negligence
claim bearing directly on policy decisions that flow from
recognition of a duty to warn. The failed attempt to detain Poddar
for evaluation, which the court described as “bungled” might have
led Poddar to avoid further therapy and served to aggravate his
feelings toward Tatiana, placing her in even greater danger. 48
43. Id. at 555.
44. Id. at n.2.
45. Id.
46. Tarasoff I, 529 P.2d at 555.
47. See id. at 561.
48. Id. at 555, 559. In fact, the court speculated that the failed effort at emergency
hospitalization could have led Poddar to discontinue treatment that might have had the effect
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This circumstance supported the recognition of the obligation of
the defendants’ “obligation to give the warning.” 49
While the University mental health clinic professionals
would have been immune from liability in undertaking the
emergency commitment 50 of Poddar for evaluation and treatment,
if necessary, their very actions in initiating the involuntary
commitment process could well have jeopardized their
relationship with their patient. Poddar, recognizing that his own
disclosures resulted in his confinement for purposes of
evaluation, and likely treatment, could have easily concluded that
he could not trust those therapists or, in fact, any others and
rejected further therapy. This unfortunate consequence of
emergency restraint for purposes of involuntary commitment
likely compromises patient trust toward treating therapists who
disclose threats they have assessed as credible, of course. As
Tarasoff makes clear, however, this is a necessary cost of
protecting an intended victim from injury or violence: “Against
this interest, however, we must weigh the public interest in safety
from violent assault.” 51
The duty imposed on mental health professionals giving rise
to liability in Tarasoff rests on two interrelated considerations, the
“foreseeability” factor underlying tort liability generally and the
existence of a “special relationship” existing between the
therapist and patient that also gives rise to the duty of
confidentiality that the patient can expect in the context of the
therapeutic relationship. 52
of successfully addressing his anger toward Tatiana and “led him to abandon his plan to kill
Tatiana, and thus that defendants, having contributed to the danger, bear a duty to give
warning.” Id. at 559 (relying on the record in the criminal appeal, People v. Poddar, 518
P.2d 342 (Cal. 1974)).
49. Id. at 559.
50. Id. at 563-64. The court relied on the state government code, which immunizes
decisions made by mental health professionals with respect to involuntary commitment, in
holding that the plaintiffs could not frame a cause of action based upon the subsequent
determination not to engage in further action to detain Poddar for evaluation. Id.; CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 856 (West 2016). An Arkansas provision similarly provides for immunity
for mental health professionals or, in fact, any individual seeking emergency civil
commitment for mental evaluation: “No officer, physician, or other person shall be held
civilly liable for his or her actions pursuant to this subchapter in the absence of proof of bad
faith, malice, or gross negligence.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-227 (2014).
51. Tarasoff I, 529 P.2d at 560.
52. Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 342-43. Even when the existence of a special relationship
is apparent, liability is only imposed if the injury-producing act is foreseeable. For instance,
in Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs., Inc., the court held that a childcare provider was
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The “foreseeability” test, as Justice Fogelman explained in
Chatman and the majority upheld in Tarasoff, is predicated on the
reasonableness of a conclusion that an individual should
recognize and appreciate the risk that an action done will result in
an injury to another. 53 But liability is not based exclusively on
foreseeability, because the law imposes no special duty to act in
defense of another, generally. 54 For instance, no one simply
observing a dangerous situation is required to act at their own risk
to prevent injury to another, or even to undertake to prevent injury
even if there is no risk to them personally.
Foreseeability becomes the critical element for liability once
the additional factor of a special relationship is demonstrated. 55
The special relationship, creating a duty of care within the
relationship, enhances the degree of responsibility for the actions
of the other party in the relationship, 56 typically the less
experienced, powerful, or competent of the parties. The
relationship may be established by law, such as the legal duty of
care a parent may owe to a child, or the relationship between an
employer and employee, giving rise to the concept of respondeat
superior that provides that an employer may be responsible for
injuries to third persons caused by employee’s in the performance
of the duties of their employment. 57
Alternatively, enhanced or increased duty may be found
when an individual deliberately assumes responsibility for the
actions of another, as in the case of the good Samaritan who
voluntarily comes to the aid of another. Or, as the Tarasoff court
observed, it may arise almost negligently, such as when a driver
leaves an vehicle operational in the presence of other persons who
could be expected to take possession and operate the vehicle
negligently. 58
not liable for the criminal acts against a child in the care of the center where there was no
showing that prior criminal acts were known to have been committed against children while
in its care, or on the property owned by the co-defendant lessor of the property because the
intentional criminal act of the third person was not foreseeable in this circumstance. 88 P.3d
517, 519 (Cal. 2004).
53. See Chatman v. Millis, 257 Ark. 451, at 459, 517 S.W.2d 504, 509-10.
54. Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 343 (“[U]nder the common law, as a general rule, one
person owed no duty to control the conduct of another.”).
55. Id. at 342-43.
56. Id. at 344-45.
57. Michael D. Morrison & Gregory N. Woods, An Examination of the Duty Concept:
Has it Evolved in Otis Engineering v. Clark?, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 375, 392-93, 396 (1984).
58. Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 343 n.7.
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The court explained that the key to the test for liability
ultimately rests on the reasonable “foreseeability” of injury to the
third person for an action done by the tortfeasor personally, or by
a third person with whom the tortfeasor shares the special
relationship that will serve to expand liability because injury done
by the other in the relationship proves “foreseeable.” 59 Further,
the court explained that the instances of this expanded concept
supporting liability are increasing, grounded in recognition of
more circumstances in which a special relationship may be
inferred. 60
In Tarasoff, Tatiana’s estate did not plead the existence of a
special relationship between her and Poddar’s treating therapists.
But the estate did plead the existence of the special relationship
existing between Poddar and those mental health professionals
and the court found that this relationship created the duty of care
toward Tatiana upon which liability for their failure to warn her
of the danger posed by Poddar could be demonstrated. 61 The
court concluded, “Such a relationship may support affirmative
duties for the benefit of third persons.” 62
Tarasoff, issued by the California court only a year later than
rejection of liability for mental health professionals not directly
in privity with third persons injured by their negligent actions in
Chatman v. Millis, became the focal point for development of law
recognizing the expanded liability for those professionals for their
acts foreseeably injuring third persons. Moreover, the Tarasoff
court expressly noted that prior decisions did not limit recovery
to situations in which the acts of physicians directly caused the
injury supporting the claim of negligence. 63 Instead, the court
relied on decisions in which the actual source of injury was, as in
Tarasoff, the patient, but the foreseeable nature of the patient’s
act or injury was either apparent to the physician, or could
reasonably have been inferred. 64
59. Id. at 342-43.
60. Id. at 343 n.5.
61. Id. at 343.
62. Id.
63. See Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 344.
64. The court explained its decision:
Decisions of other jurisdictions hold that the single relationship of a doctor to
his patient is sufficient to support the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
others against dangers emanating from the patient’s illness. The courts hold
that a doctor is liable to persons infected by his patient if he negligently fails
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One post-Tarasoff decision of particular political importance
involved an action originating in the unsuccessful assassination
attempt upon President Ronald Reagan by mental patient John
Hinckley, Jr., in 1981. 65 Following Hinckley’s acquittal by
reason of insanity, 66 the Estate of Presidential Press Secretary
James Brady, who was fatally shot in the assassination attempt,
sued Hinckley’s treating psychiatrist for negligence 67 based on a
number of theories, including a failure to warn “Hinckley’s
parents of their son’s extremely dangerous condition, and that he
should have warned law enforcement officials of Hinckley’s
potential for political assassination.” 68
The trial court considered the plaintiffs’ allegations in the
light most favorable to their complaint in the summary judgment
action, 69 rejecting the claimed failure to warn based on lack of
credible evidence of Dr. Hopper’s knowledge of Hinckley’s
dangerousness. The court, summarized the argument advanced

to diagnose a contagious disease, or, having diagnosed the illness, fails to warn
members of the patient’s family.
Id. at 559 (internal citations omitted).
65. Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1334 (D. Colo. 1983), aff’d, 751 F.2d 329
(10th Cir. 1984).
66. Hinckley was ordered released from further confinement in a mental hospital
resulting from his acquittal on July 27, 2016, in an order by the District Court based on the
court’s finding that he no longer posed a danger. See United States v. Hinckley, No. 810306 (PLF), 2016 WL 4036414, at *1, *50 (D.D.C. July 27, 2016); see also Gardiner Harris,
John Hinckley, Who Tried to Kill Reagan, Will Be Released, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/hinckley-who-tried-to-kill-reagan-to-bereleased.html [https://perma.cc/5NBV-3XE3].
67. Brady, 570 F. Supp. at 1334.
68. Id. at 1335.
69. Id. at 1338. The plaintiffs, Brady’s Estate and others injured in the shooting, had
alleged, in addition to the failure to warn, Dr. Hopper failed to perform in compliance with
the governing standard of care and that his failure resulted in Hinckley’s attempt to
assassinate President Reagan. Id. The District Judge explained the issues:
The gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint is that if Dr. Hopper had properly
performed his professional duties, he would have controlled Hinckley’s
behavior; therefore, Hinckley would not have made the presidential
assassination attempt. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that the prescription of
valium and biofeedback therapy, coupled with the advice that Hinckley’s
parents “cut him off”, aggravated Hinckley’s condition and actually
contributed to his dangerous propensity. Further, plaintiffs assert that Dr.
Hopper should have consulted with another psychiatrist regarding his form of
treatment, and that Dr. Hopper should have taken steps to have Hinckley
confined.
Id. at 1335.
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by the plaintiffs to support their claim of liability based on their
characterization of Tarasoff:
According to plaintiffs, a duty on the part of the therapist
arises whenever violence by the patient is foreseeable. In
other words, depending on the nature of the patient’s
behavior, the therapist’s duty is multifaceted: it may be to
warn the potential victim or law enforcement authorities; it
may be to take steps to have the patient confined; it may be
to warn the patient’s family or guardian of the potential
danger; or it may be to take whatever action seems
appropriate under the circumstances. Thus, plaintiffs argue,
Tarasoff dictates that the therapist has a duty to warn
whenever the patient makes specific threats, but they
distinguish a duty to control and assert the latter duty arises
whenever dangerous behavior by the patient is indicated. 70

The court also explained the contrary argument advanced by
Dr. Hopper, again relying on Tarasoff, focusing on the plaintiffs’
lack of evidence available to support their claim of liability based
on the psychiatrist’s special duty arising from his therapeutic
relationship with his patient:
It is argued that even according to the allegations in the
complaint, Hinckley had no history of violence directed to
persons other than himself; he had no history of arrests; no
previous hospitalizations arising from any violent episodes;
and in fact, he did not appear to be a danger to others. Thus,
defendant asserts, this case involves, and plaintiffs have
pled, none of the “warning signs” by which Hinckley’s
conduct or mental state would give rise to a duty on the part
of Dr. Hopper. 71

The court rejected liability based on the facts in the case,
concluding that the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs were not
foreseeable because there were no allegations that Hinckley had
ever threatened President Reagan or anyone else. 72 It conceded
that had the defendant probed more deeply in interviewing
Hinckley, Dr. Hopper might have uncovered Hinckley’s
preoccupation with “Jody Foster and the movie ‘Taxi Driver’”;
that Hinckley was interested in President Reagan and political
70. Id. at 1337.
71. Id. at 1336.
72. Brady, 570 F. Supp. at 1339.

1002

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:987

assassination; and that he had access to firearms. 73 The plaintiffs
alleged that Dr. Hopper was negligent in failing to discern that
“Hinckley suffered from delusions and severe mental illness.”74
It concluded that even if the allegations in the complaint were, in
fact, true, the evidence would be insufficient to impose a legal
duty on Dr. Hopper to protect the plaintiffs from Hinckley’s
unknown intentions. 75
Finally, the court addressed the overriding policy
considerations warranting limitation on the psychotherapists’
duty with respect to patient acts of violence:
In the present case, there are cogent policy reasons for
limiting the scope of the therapist’s liability. To impose
upon those in the counseling professions an ill-defined “duty
to control” would require therapists to be ultimately
responsible for the actions of their patients. Such a rule
would closely approximate a strict liability standard of care,
and therapists would be potentially liable for all harm
inflicted by persons presently or formerly under psychiatric
treatment. Human behavior is simply too unpredictable, and
the field of psychotherapy presently too inexact, to so greatly
expand the scope of therapists’ liability. 76

C. Post-Tarasoff Decisions: The Scope of the Duty to
Warn
Following the California court’s decision in Tarasoff
expanding liability of mental health professionals with respect to
the duty to warn individuals identified by patients making
credible threats of violence, state courts addressed the
implications of the decision in their own jurisdictions. Some
jurisdictions have rejected the underlying premise of Tarasoff,
that treating mental health professionals owe a duty of care to
third parties for violent actions taken by patients against those
third parties when a therapist has actual knowledge of the
patient’s threat to commit an act of violence and the identity of
the victim of a credible threat is disclosed to the therapist.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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For example, in 2009, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
the Tarasoff rationale in Tedrick v. Cmty. Res. Ctr., Inc., 77
essentially applying the same requirement for privity the
Arkansas court had relied upon in Chatman v. Millis. 78 The case
involved allegations that the mental patient’s treating therapist
failed to warn the patient’s wife of the patient’s threats toward her
prior to her murder. 79 The court conducted a review of prior
Illinois decisions that had fairly consistently held that third
persons could not recover for injuries caused by mental patients
based on claims of liability against their treating therapists. 80 It
then rested its continuing adherence to preclusion of recovery for
claimed therapist negligence causing injuries to third persons by
their patients based on the strong public policy interests favoring
protection of the confidential relationship between mental health
professionals and their patients. 81
The concern for the impact of expanded tort liability upon
the confidentiality duty for mental health professionals engaged
in the therapeutic relationship remains significant, possibly the
singularly most important factor in that expansion. Different
77. 920 N.E.2d 220, 228 (Ill. 2009).
78. See supra Part II.A. Courts have traditionally equated the concepts of privity and
special relationships. See Shelly A. Finger, Jones v. SEC: Upholding the SEC’s Ability to
Impose Sanctions in Addition to Those of the NASD, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 989, 1004 n.79
(1999). Hence, the Tedrick court’s focus on whether there was a special relationship between
a patient and her physician or the physician and a third party is not far removed from the
Chatman court’s analysis of whether there was privity between a physician and a third party.
79. Tedrick, 920 N.E.2d at 221.
80. Id. at 224-25. The Tedrick court cited prior decisions in Kirk v. Michael Reese
Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 398-99 (Ill. 1987) (recovery against physician claimed
strictly liable by third party passenger injured in automobile accident caused when
discharged patient under influence of prescribed psychiatric medication and alcohol recovery
not available under state law where plaintiff claimed physician did not warn patient of effects
of medication, but no special relationship existed between physician and passenger); and
Doe v. McKay, 700 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ill. 1998) (denying recovery based on father’s claim
that psychologist’s negligence caused daughter to erroneously believe father had sexually
molested her as a child, injuring father/daughter relationship where no relationship existed
between father and therapist with respect to this specific allegation). Id. at 223. In Kirk,
moreover, there was no allegation that the treating physician was aware of any threat to the
safety of the passenger, or allegation that the discharged patient was known to have violent
propensities. Id. The claim was grounded in strict liability, rather than negligence, in an
apparent effort to address the lack of evidence of the physician’s malpractice or actual
negligence. Id. at 223-24.
81. Id. at 224. The court, citing its earlier Doe opinion, explained that “[t]he problem
of divided loyalties, [and the concerns about compromising patient confidentiality], argue
strongly against imposing on therapists a duty of care toward nonpatients.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
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courts have weighed the competing values represented by
confidentiality and foreseeability of patient-caused injury, as
illustrated by the decisions in Tarasoff and Tedrick, and within
the same jurisdiction over time, as illustrated by the Arkansas
Supreme Court decisions in Chatman v. Millis and Fleming v.
Vest. State legislatures have also addressed these concerns, with
a majority of states recognizing the conflict, typically moving
toward favoring a duty to prevent injury over maintenance of a
strict adherence to the confidentiality obligation.
Professor Mark A. Rothstein has observed that while the
impact of Tarasoff was initially seen in judicial decisions in a
number of jurisdictions, legislative action has dramatically
increased its influence on mental health professionals, although
in particularly non-uniform approaches:
In reviewing the state statutes, it is clear there is no single
Tarasoff duty, but 51 jurisdiction-specific duties. As of 2014,
29 states have laws mandating the reporting of serious
threats, 16 states and the District of Columbia have
permissive reporting laws, four states have no duty to report,
and one state (Georgia) has its own unique law.
Some state statutes apply different standards to
different professionals (e.g., psychologists, social workers).
Other state laws differ on the circumstances when warnings
or other actions are appropriate or vary in the individuals or
entities that must be protected. Finally, some states grant
immunity from liability if the mental health professional
complies with certain statutory requirements. 82

Other jurisdictions have embraced the Tarasoff court’s
reasoning judicially, in whole or in part. 83 Once a state court
adopts the basic rule that foreseeability would determine the
82. Mark A. Rothstein, Tarasoff Duties After Newton, 42 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 104,
106 n.23-30 (2014) (citing Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn, NAT’L.
CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Sept.
28,
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx
[https://perma.cc/HT32-96TZ]). Professor Rothstein is the Herbert F. Boehl Chair of Law
and Medicine and the Director of the Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law at the
University of Louisville School of Medicine in Kentucky. Mark A. Rothstein, UNIV. OF
LOUISVILLE,
https://louisville.edu/bioethics/directory/mark-a.-rothstein
[https://perma.cc/MD5H-PVP9]. For a list of states having statutes referenced in the article,
see Appendix A.
83. See Nasser v. Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502, 504-05 (Va. 1995); see also Leonard v.
Latrobe Area Hosp., 625 A.2d 1228, 1230-32 (Pa. 1993).
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scope of duty owed third persons by mental health professionals
in the course of their therapeutical activities, the issue of scope
itself became critical. Three Iowa decisions in which the state
supreme court did not expressly adopt Tarasoff illustrate the
point.

1. Recovery Based on the Patient’s Intervening
Criminal Act Contrary to Public Policy
First, the Iowa Supreme Court faced a rather bizarre claim in
Cole v. Taylor, 84 a 1981 decision. The court summarized the
issue: “whether a patient may recover in tort from her psychiatrist
on a claim that, in his professional capacity, he negligently failed
to prevent her from committing murder.” 85 The plaintiff/patient
argued that her psychiatrist was negligent in failing to take
appropriate action to prevent the murder of her ex-husband once
she disclosed her threats to kill him.86
Cole made three different, but interrelated arguments in
suing her psychiatrist after she was convicted 87 of her exhusband’s murder: “that the defendant failed in his treatment of
her, that he failed to restrain her by hospitalization, and failed to
warn her former husband of any impending danger.” 88 The third
claim clearly implicated the Tarasoff theory of duty on the part of
the treating mental health professional, but the court, noting that
it had not adopted Tarasoff as applicable in Iowa law, 89 rejected
her reliance on the California court’s reasoning on the facts.
Tarasoff addressed the duty a therapist owes to a third person,
there, the murder victim, and does not afford a basis for recovery
for the patient who perpetrates the violence in acting upon her
threats. 90
Clearly, Cole’s reliance on Tarasoff liability did not fit the
facts of the case, as the majority observed, but her ex-husband’s
estate could have argued for liability under Tarasoff, yet did not
do so. In an odd sense, then, Cole’s assertion of this theory of
liability served the same purpose as a third-party claim in which
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

301 N.W.2d 766, 767 (Iowa 1981).
Id. at 766.
Id. at 767.
Id.
Id.
Cole, 301 N.W.2d at 767-68.
Id.
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the defense argues that any compensation owed to the plaintiff
due to injury should be assessed indirectly against the third party
because it was their negligence that actually caused the injury.
The estate could have brought an action against Dr. Taylor using
the Tarasoff theory of liability and likely forcing the Iowa court
to either embrace that decision or reject it directly on the merits.
But, while the court noted “a certain strength” in the
plaintiff’s arguments, 91 it nevertheless rejected Cole’s claims of
negligence on Dr. Taylor’s part on the basis of public policy
because the cause of injury was the plaintiff’s own illegal act. 92
With respect to her claim that Dr. Taylor was negligent in failing
to restrain her through involuntary hospitalization, the “certain
strength” in her arguments might be seen as more plausible,
assuming that the illegal act itself—the murder of her exhusband—could have been prevented through hospitalization,
had she been able to demonstrate that her act was excused as a
result of mental impairment at the time it was committed. In fact,
however, Cole’s trial jury convicted her, 93 rejecting her claim of
diminished capacity 94 and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed her
conviction on direct appeal. 95
Despite the potential for recognition of Cole’s claims of
negligence as logically flowing from the duty principle, the Iowa
court decided against recovery by the patient against a therapist
when the injury to the third person results from the patient’s own
criminal act. 96 Instead of accepting the logic and extending
liability in such situations, the court rejected it in favor of public
policy designed to prevent those who cause injury from profiting
from their violent or illegal acts. 97

91. Id. at 768.
92. Id.
93. State v. Cole, 295 N.W.2d 29, 29 (Iowa 1980).
94. Id. at 30, 35. Iowa recognizes the defense of diminished capacity, as Justice Harris
explained citing IOWA R. CRIM. P. 10 (10)(b), now Rule 2.11(11)b(1). Id. at 40 (Harris, J.,
dissenting). Iowa law defines the defense of insanity statutorily, IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.4
(West 2016), but diminished capacity or diminished responsibility are based on common law
and not addressed by statute. See Anfinson v. State, 494 N.W.2d 496, 502 n.6 (Iowa 2008).
95. Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1981).
96. The court explained, “Here plaintiff’s responsibility for her criminal conduct was
established by her conviction in the murder prosecution which we affirmed. It is that very
criminal act which she claims as her damages, an element of recovery in this suit.” Id.
97. Id.
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2. No Recovery When Intended Victim Was Already
Aware of Threat
Second, in Estate of Votteler, 98 the court was called upon to
consider whether the mental health professional should be held
liable for failure to warn an identified victim who was involved
with the patient’s estranged husband, Donald, of the patient’s
threats against her. 99 Following the death of the patient’s
psychiatrist, the victim, Ramona, filed an action against his estate,
claiming negligence in his failure to interview Donald to
determine the credibility of the patient’s threats against her,
alleging that Dr. Votteler’s professional expertise would have
been important in leading Donald to protect her against Lola,
Donald’s wife and the psychiatrist’s patient. 100 The evidence,
however, was unequivocal in showing that both Ramona and
Donald were well aware of Lola’s propensity for violence, even
without a professional assessment from Dr. Votteler, including
this reference to the record by the court:
In order to keep Donald from going out at night, Lola
occasionally threatened him with a two by four, and hid or
burned his clothing. She threatened to kill herself and
subsequently attempted suicide. Once she burned Donald
with a cigarette and another time beat him with an iron pipe.
When he obtained medical treatment for his beating injuries,
the physician advised him to stay away from Lola because
she was “crazy.” Lola threatened to kill Donald and plaintiff
more than once. The last threat was made the night before
the assault with the car in the park, when she caught up with
them after a car chase. Prior to that event, she had tried to

98. 327 N.W.2d 759, 760 (Iowa 1982).
99. Id. at 760-61. The patient, Lola, was also acquainted with Ramona, the victim,
who was injured when Lola drove “an automobile over her” in a local park. Id. at 760.
100. Id. at 761. The court explained the core of the allegation that Dr. Votteler was
responsible for Ramona’s claimed failure to appreciate the significance of Lola’s threats:
In contending Dr. Votteler should have warned Donald that Lola was
dangerous, plaintiff insists that neither her knowledge of Lola’s violent nature
nor the threats alarmed her. She contends she would have taken the situation
seriously only if a warning originated with a professional like Dr. Votteler.
Id.
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run Donald down with her car on one occasion and to run
down both Donald and plaintiff on two other occasions. 101

In rejecting liability, the Iowa court noted the decision in
Tarasoff,102 but declined to expressly adopt its reasoning as
applicable to Iowa tort law. Instead, the court explained that
regardless, it would not find liability on the record before it. 103
The court found that while the victim, Ramona, and the
patient’s estranged husband, Donald, both had actual knowledge
of the patient’s threats to commit violence, there was no evidence
that Dr. Votteler actually had any such knowledge himself. 104
Instead, the court characterized her claim:
Plaintiff’s theory of action assumes Dr. Votteler lacked
actual knowledge of Lola’s violent propensities. She alleges
he had a duty to ask appropriate questions of Donald to elicit
that information. Then, according to her theory, Dr. Votteler
should have warned Donald of Lola’s dangerousness and
Donald in turn should have warned her. She acknowledges

101. Id. The evidence also showed that Lola had also threatened to kill Ramona when
Ramona and Lola’s sister earlier had initiated a civil commitment proceeding that ended up
with Lola’s voluntary commitment, during which Dr. Votteler had treated her. Id.
102. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). The Iowa court declined to adopt and apply Tarasoff
in a later decision, Estate of Long ex rel. Smith v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 656 N.W.2d 71,
80 (Iowa 2002), where the claim for malpractice was predicated on the murder of a patient’s
wife by a mental patient’s release from hospitalization necessitated by complex diagnosis of
disorders or symptoms, including post-traumatic stress disorder, polysubstance abuse,
initially including hallucinations and flashbacks. Id. at 77-78. The cause of action was
actually based upon failure of the institution to notify the patient’s wife of his discharge so
that she could leave the marital residence before he was able to confront her again. Id. He
was discharged from Broadlawns to travel to a center for chemical dependency, but
subsequently left that facility:
[He] went to a local pawnshop, pawned his watch, and bought a bus ticket back
to Des Moines. Gerald returned to the marital residence, perhaps to lie in wait
for Jillene. When Jillene returned to the home that evening, Gerald shot her
several times, killing her.
Id. at 78. Interestingly, the court again expressly declined to hold that Tarasoff would apply
in this Iowa case: “We have not previously adopted the duty principles enunciated in
Tarasoff and do not do so at this time.” Id. at 80. Still, the court upheld the finding of
negligence based on the failure to notify the patient’s wife of his discharge, but found
Tarasoff inapplicable based on its conclusion that the “special relationship” underlying that
decision existed between the patient and treating institution, but that the wife’s death was
attributable to the special relationship created by Broadlawns’ promise to warn the patient’s
wife of her husband’s discharge, which was necessitated by her actual knowledge of her
husband’s propensity for violence. Id. at 80-81.
103. Estate of Votteler, 327 N.W.2d at 760.
104. Id.
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that a warning from Donald alone or from persons other than
Dr. Votteler would have done no good. 105

The court rejected this attempt to create a duty on Dr.
Votteler’s part designed to bring the case within the Tarasoff
rationale, explaining that under these facts, plaintiff’s theory
attenuates the Tarasoff rule beyond the breaking point. The court
went on to say, “Even if we were to adopt that rule, we could not
allow recovery in a case like this. Nor has any other jurisdiction
done so.” 106 Once the intended victim of the patient’s threat has
actual knowledge of the threat, the rationale for imposing liability
based on the mental health professional’s duty to warn under
Tarasoff fails.107

3. No Liability to the Public Generally
Third, in Leonard v. State, 108 the Iowa Supreme Court
addressed the problem posed by the claim that the mental health
professionals were negligent in failing to warn of the potential for
violence committed by a mental patient where there was no
identifiable victim of any threat made by the patient. 109 In
Tarasoff, an important factor in the court’s decision was that the
therapists knew that Tatiana was Poddar’s intended victim so that
it was not unreasonable to expect notification to her of his threats,
thereby permitting her to take action to avoid injury. 110 In
contrast, the facts in Leonard gave no indication that anyone had
any reason to believe Leonard was personally threatened by the
potentially violent patient, Parrish. 111
Diagnosed with Bi-Polar Disorder, Parrish had been
discharged from a mental health facility after reaching “maximum
inpatient psychiatric benefits,” according to the discharge
summary. 112 He returned to work as a demolition contractor with
directions to continue outpatient therapy and hired plaintiff
Leonard to work for him. 113 Following a day when the two men
105. Id. at 761.
106. Id. at 762.
107. See Boulanger v. Pol, 900 P.2d 823, 835-36 (Kan. 1995) (citing Estate of Votteler
and holding that no liability attaches when the victim was already aware of threat).
108. 491 N.W.2d 508, 508-09 (Iowa 1992).
109. Id. at 511.
110. Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 340.
111. Leonard, 491 N.W.2d at 511.
112. Id. at 509-10.
113. Id. at 510.
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spent their time drinking, rather than working, they returned to
Parrish’s residence where he subsequently beat Leonard severely
about his head and body and left him unconscious and locked
inside his house. 114 Parrish was subsequently convicted of
kidnapping and attempted murder. 115
Leonard brought his action against the state and its mental
health facility under the Iowa Tort Claims Act, 116 alleging
negligence, specifically asserting that “the defendants failed to
provide Parrish with proper care and treatment and that they
subsequently discharged him knowing that he posed a threat to
those with whom he might come in contact.” 117 What Leonard
was able to show was that Parrish had a lengthy history of
psychiatric hospitalizations and criminal charges for minor, but
somewhat violent offenses. What he could not demonstrate was
that the State and its mental health professional employees had a
basis for knowing that he was an intended victim of Parrish, and
in circumstances in which it would be reasonable to conclude that,
in fact, he was not an intended victim at all, 118 but was assaulted
only because he was with Parrish during his employer’s
intoxication.
The Iowa court’s opinion never mentioned Tarasoff, but
clearly addressed the broader question of the scope of the mental
health professional’s duty to protect third persons from injuries
committed by their patients. Acknowledging the existence of the
special relationship that exists between therapists and patients, the
court framed this question:
There can be little doubt that a special relationship existed
between Parrish and his treating physician at MHI. His
continuing involuntary commitment only serves to reinforce
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. IOWA CODE ANN. § 669.1 (Westlaw 2016). Under the Act, individuals injured
as a result of negligence on the part of a state employee may recover “under circumstances
where the state, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss,
injury, or death.” IOWA CODE ANN. § 669.2(3)(a) (Westlaw 2016). In contrast, Arkansas
does not provide a civil remedy for actions by the State or its officials or employees acting
within the course of their official duties, insulating those potential defendants to civil liability
pursuant to the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity. ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20;
ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-305 (2007). Instead, a party injured by the State may proceed by
filing a claim with the Arkansas Claims Commission. ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-201 et seq.
(2007).
117. Leonard v. State, 491 N.W.2d, 508, 510 (Iowa 1992).
118. Id. at 511.
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that bond. Therefore MHI had a duty to control Parrish’s
conduct, or at least not negligently release him from custody.
But the Restatement rules cited above do not answer the
precise question before us: Does the duty to refrain from
negligently releasing dangerous persons from custody run
from the custodian to the public at large or only to the
reasonably foreseeable victims of the patient’s dangerous
tendencies? 119

The Leonard court recognized a singular significant factor
in the post-Tarasoff development of professional negligence law
that would bear directly on the likely consideration of liability in
Fleming v. Vest. That is, as explained succinctly by the court, the
liability of a treating therapist might include a duty to warn
“foreseeable victims of the patient’s dangerous tendencies,”
without warranting an expansion of this limited basis for recovery
to encompass a general duty to protect against any injury caused
by a patient, regardless of actual knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding an assaultive, or negligent, act committed by the
patient. 120 The latter approach could virtually impose a duty
predicated on strict liability in which the therapist assumes
virtually all liability for the actions of the patient or, liability
without proof of foreseeable injury, or perhaps liability without
proof of any deviation from the recognized standard of care.
Recognition that liability can be imposed without proof of
negligence or foreseeability would likely emasculate—if not
eliminate—all mental state-based professional practice.
The court observed that judicial consideration of the duty of
mental health practitioners to respond to potential patient violence
targeting third persons had resulted in diverse approaches in
119. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315, 319 (AM. LAW. INST.
1965), which address the exceptions to the general common law rule that a person has “no
duty to control the conduct of a third person”). Section 319 recognizes an exception to the
general rule: “One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to
be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 319. The court also noted the Restatement’s illustration of this
proposition: “[T]he liability of a hospital to a person infected by a diseased patient who is
negligently released, and the liability of an insane asylum for injury caused by the negligent
release of a homicidal maniac. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 cmt. a, illus. 1,
2.” Leonard, 491 N.W.2d at 511.
120. Id. The Leonard court noted the lack of evidence that the treating professionals
had any reason to discern that Parrish posed a threat to a class of persons including Leonard,
particularly endangered by Parrish’s release other than “the public at large.” Id.
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response. 121 Some courts had addressed liability based on duty to
protect or warn by basically imposing liability on professionals
for failure to protect or warn the public at large or, to classes of
potential victims,122 while other courts had limited recovery
based on the duty to warn of patient violence that could
reasonably be anticipated by the treating therapist. 123 The court
noted that other jurisdictions imposed liability only for injuries
sustained by third persons specifically identified in patient
threats. 124
On the facts presented, specifically the lack of any
knowledge that Leonard would be victimized by Parrish, the Iowa
court rejected the argument that the liability for the patient’s
violence should extend to the public generally. 125 The court
reasoned that imposing liability for decisions to discharge or
release involuntarily, concluding: “the risks to the general public
posed by the negligent release of dangerous mental patients
would be far outweighed by the disservice to the general public if
treating physicians were subject to civil liability for discharge
decisions.” 126
In contrast, in Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 127 the federal
district court was called upon to assess whether the Nebraska
121. Id.
122. E.g., Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Colo. 1989) (liability based on
negligent release of violent mental patient who killed police office, without specific intended
victim, therapist still under duty to assess patient’s propensity for violence and protect others
by restraining patient for longer period); Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1072-73 (Del. 1984)
(holding that psychiatrists have an affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care in the
treatment, evaluation, and discharge of inpatients and that the affirmative duty includes a
duty to control the patient and a duty to warn third parties); Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d
86 (Kan. 1983) (subsequently limited to liability based on release of involuntarily committed
mental hospital patients in Boulanger v. Pol, 900 P.2d 823 (Kan. 1995)).
123. E.g., Hamman v. Cty. of Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122, 1127-28 (Ariz. 1989)
(applying Tarasoff where therapist could have reasonably identified violent patient’s family
as most likely potential victims, warranting liability even if no specific threat against
identified target disclosed); Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 230, 236-37 (Wash. 1983) (liability
based on release of patient who had previously demonstrated dangerousness when driving
while intoxicated when released overnight and danger known to therapist who should have
foreseen dangerous to others).
124. E.g., Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp., 454 A.2d 414, 420-21 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1983) (following Tarasoff and strictly limiting recovery to situations involving a
known victim disclosed to therapist); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1979) (discussing Tarasoff and finding liability where specific victim identified in
patient’s threat was disclosed to therapist).
125. Leonard v. State, 491 N.W.2d, 508, 511-12 (Iowa 1992).
126. Id. (relying on Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661, 666-67 (Mo. 1983)).
127. 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
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Supreme Court would impose liability upon a mental health
provider whose patient had killed the plaintiff and wounded the
patient’s wife with a shotgun when he found them together at an
Omaha nightclub. 128 The plaintiff’s estate brought an action
against Sears, which had sold the shotgun to the patient, 129 which
then brought a third party action against the Veteran’s
Administration, which had treated the patient for mental health
issues, alleging its negligence was the cause of injury:
[B]ecause the V.A. knew or should have known that [the
patient] was dangerous to himself and others, and because
the V.A., despite this knowledge, failed “to take those steps,
and to initiate those measures and procedures customarily
taken or initiated for the care and treatment of mentally ill
and dangerous persons by mental health professionals
practicing in the community.” 130

The plaintiffs then added the United States as a necessary
party in the action against VA, 131 stating a claim under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. 132 Because the claims arose in Nebraska, the
District Court looked to Nebraska law in discerning whether the
state would recognize a duty imposed upon psychiatrists to avoid
injury to third persons due to patient violence. However, the
absence of state law on the point led the court to consider whether
Nebraska would impose such a duty in a proper case. 133

128. Id. at 187.
129. Id. The plaintiff alleged that Sears knew or should have known that the purchaser
of the shotgun “had been adjudged mentally defective or had been committed to a mental
institution.” Id. Although some claim of knowledge would appear logically necessary as an
element of the negligence claim, the problem of actual notice of impairment remains a
significant issue when discussions of responsibility for avoiding injury to third persons from
the actions of mental patients are raised. Id. at 194 n.9. It seems highly unlikely that in 1980
Sears would have had any knowledge or reason to have knowledge that the purchaser
represented a threat to anyone due to mental impairment. In Lipari, Sears apparently
declined to settle the plaintiff’s claim, accepting the cost of litigation and possibility of
setting unfavorable precedent. Id. at 187 (filing a third-party complaint against the United
States under the Federal Torts Claims Act, alleging that the United States was liable to Sears
under the doctrines of contribution and indemnity for any damages).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 188.
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Looking to Tarasoff and the New Jersey decision in
McIntosh v. Milano, 134 the Lipari Court focused on the
consideration of the special relationship existing between mental
health providers and their patients, concluding that the Nebraska
courts would recognize a duty for those professionals to avoid
potential injury to third persons. 135 The court also predicated its
reasoning on an older Nebraska decision imposing a duty on a
physician to violate patient confidence in order to prevent the
spread of a contagious disease. 136
In rejecting the Government’s argument that imposition of a
duty to prevent danger to third persons involves too great a burden
upon mental health professionals to determine which patients are
predisposed to act violent, the Lipari Court cited numerous
federal decisions in which such a duty had been found. It
explained: “The argument of the United States ignores the fact
that psychiatrists and mental hospitals have been held liable for
failing to predict the dangerous propensities of their patients.”137
Also noting that the Nebraska Supreme Court had similarly held
that hospitals owe a duty to third persons upon learning of
potential patient dangerousness to others, 138 the court concluded:
“These cases from Nebraska and other jurisdictions clearly show
that the difficulty in predicting dangerousness has not caused the
Nebraska Supreme Court or other courts to deny the existence of
a cause of action for the negligence of the doctor or hospital.” 139
The Lipari Court, however, also recognized the significant
burden imposed on mental health professionals in assessing risk
134. 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (holding that psychiatrists have a
duty to warn a person after determining that their patient posed a physical threat to that
person).
135. Id. (observing that the “Tarasoff-McIntosh rule imposing an affirmative duty on
psychotherapists was the courts’ adoption of the special relationship analysis of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315.”).
136. Id. at 191 (citing, inter alia, Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb.
1920)).
137. Id. (citing Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407, 415-17 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Eanes
v. United States, 407 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1969); White v. United States, 317 F.2d 13, 17 (4th
Cir. 1963); Johnson v. United States, 409 F. Supp. 1283, 1292-94 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev’d on
other grounds, 576 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1978); Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.
Pa. 1971); Merch. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409, 417-19
(D.N.D. 1967); Baker v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 129, 132-35 (S.D. Iowa 1964), aff’d,
343 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1965)).
138. Id. (citing Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Mem’l Hosp., 173 N.W.2d 881, 884-85
(Neb. 1970)).
139. Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 191.
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of violence in patients, relying on the limiting perspective in
Tarasoff, focusing on the best practices for patient evaluation in
determining breach of duty, rather than predicating liability on the
mere fact that the professional engaging in a proper approach to
the risk assessment erred, in hindsight. 140 The court concluded:
“Under this standard, a therapist who uses the proper psychiatric
procedures is not negligent even if his diagnosis may have been
incorrect. Given this protection, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that
the difficulty in predicting dangerousness does not justify denying
recovery in all cases.” 141
The Lipari Court also addressed the issue limiting Tarasoff
liability, the requirement for disclosure of an indentified
prospective victim of patient violence as critical to imposition of
a duty upon the mental health professional to warn the prospective
victim. 142 It explained that other courts had expanded the scope
of potential victims to whom mental health professionals owe a
duty to warn or protect, concluding that Nebraska would adopt a
broader formulation than the limited approach taken by the
California courts. 143 But it also imposed the burden upon the
plaintiffs to demonstrate that they were within the class of persons
whom the VA mental health professionals could reasonably have
foreseen the unreasonable risk of injury necessary for imposition
of the duty to prevent harm. 144
The Lipari litigation demonstrates the two different aspects
of the duty to prevent patient violence injuring third persons
common in such cases. Tarasoff cases arise in the context of
actual disclosures of intent to injure, including the identity of the
prospective victim. 145 In those cases, warnings from the provider
to the victim directly, or through law enforcement, may prove
effective in preventing injury, although this will not always
140. Id. at 192 (citing Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 344-45).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 194 (noting that in Mavroudis v. Super. Ct. for Cty. of San Mateo, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 729 (1980), Tarasoff liability was expressly limited to situations in which the
treating professional had been told the identity of the patient’s prospective victim).
143. Id.
144. Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 194-95 (“These cases illustrate the importance of
foreseeability in defining the scope of a person’s duty to exercise due care. Thus, the
plaintiffs and third-party plaintiff must prove that the risk created by the V.A.’s negligence
was such that, under the circumstances, the V.A.’s employees could have reasonably
foreseen an unreasonable risk of harm to the Liparis or a class of persons of which the Liparis
were members.”).
145. Id. at 194.
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necessarily prevent ultimate commission of an act of violence
injuring the third person. The second aspect of duty lies in the
ability of the mental health professional or institution to take
action to prevent potential injury to third persons, including nonidentified individuals, through emergency hospitalization or
involuntary civil commitment. 146 Even recourse to this remedy
does not permanently isolate the patient, of course, or prevent the
patient from eventually regaining freedom and engaging in
violence toward others.
The different approaches taken by courts confronted with
issues of psychotherapist liability based on violent acts committed
by patients against third persons, following the California holding
in Tarasoff, demonstrate the diverse response to novel claims or
emerging legal doctrines when considered by different courts.
This reflects a reality of the common law system in which legal
principles are traditionally announced by courts in the context of
individual cases, rather than by legislative action designed to
shape the parameters of legal rights generally.

III. FLEMING v. VEST: TARASOFF INFLUENCES
ARKANSAS LAW
Arkansas courts have yet to fully embrace the underlying
principle of Tarasoff—that mental health professionals owe a
duty of care to third persons with regard to injuries caused by the
acts of their patients—although the published decision in Fleming
v. Vest, 147 issued in late 2015, clearly suggests that Chatman v.
Millis is in the process of being overruled, if only by implication
thus far.
There are reasons to question the ultimate impact Tarasoff
will have in the long-run because Fleming v. Vest rests on
somewhat shaky foundation. It is sufficiently weakened by the
procedural context in which the Arkansas Court of Appeals
146. Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 351.
147. 2015 Ark. App. 636, 475 S.W.3d 576. Judge Harrison, in his concurring opinion,
notes the following:
This case brings Arkansas to an important judicial crossroads: will our courts
continue to expand the Act’s definition of what constitutes a “medical injury”
and thus pull more providers into the Act’s orbit? Or will they begin taking a
more nuanced approach, especially in cases where a medical-care provider’s
patient commits an intentional harm upon a third person, and more carefully
analyze whether a provider can be sued in tort at all?
Id. at 14, 475 S.W.3d at 584-85 (Harrison, J., concurring).
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reached its decision applying the underlying principles of
Tarasoff such that it is necessary to consider the procedural issues
in assessing the strength of Tarasoff in resolving claims in
Arkansas cases. 148 Significantly, the decision of the circuit court
in granting the defense’s motion to dismiss 149 following remand
from the court of appeals serves to demonstrate the difficulty
plaintiffs will likely face in using Tarasoff as a basis for liability
against mental health providers.
Moreover, it is important to note that Tarasoff represents
only one theory of liability for mental health professionals based
on failure to warn third persons of potential injury based on
disclosed threats of a patient. However, to the extent that Tarasoff
recognizes duty to third persons based on foreseeability of injury,
it has opened the door to a broader understanding of the impact of
mental health professionals’ decision-making on those outside the
therapist/patient relationship who also interact with the patient.
The decision in Fleming v. Vest rests on the perception that mental
health professionals can reasonably be expected to appreciate the
broad impact their treatment decisions—and the underlying
problems leading their patients to seek or be ordered into
treatment—may have on others who might otherwise be viewed
as innocent or unknowing with respect to patient thinking that
may be misguided, delusional, perverse or simply dangerous. 150

148. Id. at 7, 475 S.W.3d at 581 (basing a major part of decision on the statute of
limitation).
149. Order, Fleming v. Vest, No. CV2011-164-III (Garland Cty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 15,
2016),
http://circuit051.courtconnect.net/docsdms/Default.aspx?A=106/ck_image.present?DMS_I
D=55087f66-350a-4fa2-856f-1f9d7d191952 [https://perma.cc/E6RZ-SNEE].
150. Mental health clinicians are called upon to assess the potential for their patients
to commit acts of violence in the future. See, e.g., BRUCE J. COHEN, THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF PSYCHIATRY 445 (2003) (“While clinicians are not able to predict whether a given
individual will engage in future acts of violence with a high degree of certainty, they are
capable of assessing whether that individual is high, medium, or low risk for engaging in
future violence.”). Dr. Cohen is the Director of the Forensic Psychiatry Residency Training
Program at the Univeristy of Virginia. Bruce J Cohen, MD, U. OF VA. HEALTH SYS.,
https://uvahealth.com/findadoctor/profile/bruce-j-cohen [https://perma.cc/7UCB-REJV].
In evaluating the relationship of mental health diagnoses and perpetrators of mass
shooting violence, Dr. Dewey Cornell, a clinical psychologist and faculty associate at the
Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, writes in this
guest editorial that mental illness is not a common factor in recent acts of mass violence,
while noting that statistical evidence shows that incidents of mass violence are actually
decreasing, not increasing over the past twenty years. Dewey G. Cornell, Gun Violence and
Mass Shootings—Myths, Facts and Solutions, WASH. POST (June 11, 2014),
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The developing state of tort law following Chatman v. Millis
may have foreshadowed the potentially broad reach applied by
the majority in Fleming v. Vest, as evidenced by the factual
context underlying the litigation in Jean-Pierre v. Plantation
Homes of Crittenden Cty. 151 Jean-Pierre was a 2002 decision
rendered by the Arkansas Supreme Court focusing on a
procedural issue in the litigation, rather than on the issue of
professional liability. 152 A patient under the care of Plantation
Homes, doing business as Southwoods—a residential care facility
for the mentally handicapped—left the institution and stole a car,
killing another individual, Mrs. Mills, in a head-on collision.153
Her estate sued Behavioral Health Services (BHS), with whom
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/06/11/gun-violence-and-massshootings-myths-facts-and-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/2S8F-X5UY]. He explains:
It seems intuitive that anyone who commits a mass shooting must be mentally
ill, but this is a misuse of the term “mental illness.” Mental illness is a term
reserved for the most severe mental disorders where the person has severe
symptoms such as delusions or hallucinations. Decades of mental health
research show that only a small proportion of persons with mental illness
commit violent acts, and together they account for only a fraction of violent
crime. Some mass shooters have had a mental illness. Most do not.
Id. Dr. Cornell points out, however, that mental health intervention is an important factor in
preventing mass shootings:
In case after case of mass shootings, we learn later that family members,
friends, and even mental health professionals were concerned that someone
needed help. Predicting violence is difficult, but identifying that someone
needs assistance is not so difficult. This is where we need to readjust our focus
and concentrate on helping people in distress. This approach requires not only
a change in police policy but community mental health services that are
oriented around prevention.
Id. For further commentary on the scope of expectation for mental health professionals to
anticipate patient violence, see infra notes 277, 278, 284 and accompanying text.
151. 350 Ark. 569, 89 S.W.3d 337 (2002). Plantation Homes did business as
Southwoods Residential Care Facility. Id. at 569, 89 S.W.3d at 338.
152. Id. at 572-73, 89 S.W.3d at 339. The issue before the state supreme court
involved the physician’s liability on a third-party claim brought by BHS, which had
employed Dr. John-Pierre, alleging that he was negligent—BHS having been subject to
cross-claim by Southwoods in the event it was found negligent. Id. at 572, 89 S.W.3d at
339. Southwoods cross-claimed against BHS, claiming that Mrs. Mills’ injuries, if
established, resulted from negligence on the part of BHS and Dr. Jean-Pierre. Id. at 572, 89
S.W.3d at 339. Southwoods settled the claim with the Mills estate for $775,000. JeanPierre, 350 Ark. at 573, 89 S.W.3d at 339. Southwoods then filed a motion for default
judgment against the doctor. Id. at 573, 89 S.W.3d at 339. Although BHS filed an answer
denying liability, which should have served to protect Dr. Jean-Pierre, appellate counsel
essentially defaulted his defense by changing their specific theory of the case from that
argued in the trial court, leaving the psychiatrist to indemnify Southwoods in the amount of
$775,000. Id. at 574, 89 S.W.3d at 340.
153. Id. at 572, 89 S.W.3d at 338.

2017]

ARKANSAS, MEET TARASOFF

1019

the care facility contracted to provide medical and psychiatric
health services alleging negligence “for failing to take appropriate
steps to control Wilder, despite its recognition that he posed a
high risk for dangerous actions.” 154 Her estate further alleged that
Southwoods was negligent “in failing to maintain control over
Wilder and in admitting him to its facility without adequately
evaluating the degree of risk he posed.” 155
The negligence theory rested on the assertion that it was
foreseeable to the care facility, its contracting party for
psychiatric services, and Dr. Jean-Pierre, that the patient posed a
threat to commit actions dangerous to third persons such as Mrs.
Miller. 156 While the court’s focus was entirely upon the
procedural technicalities in the litigation in terms of imposing the
costs of Southwoods’ settlement of the Estates’ claim for
damages, the theory for recovery necessarily raised the questions
of foreseeability and duty toward third persons who might
foreseeably be injured by the actions of the patient in the care of
both the institution and the psychiatrist who contracted to provide
care for the patient. In settling the claim, the care facility
effectively conceded liability based upon this theory of duty owed
to third persons by those providing mental health services to
impaired patients. 157
The published decision in Mills did not directly advance the
development of Arkansas professional liability law because it
addressed only the procedural aspects of the default judgment
taken against the treating psychiatrist and his unsuccessful appeal;
only in its very brief summary of the theories of negligence
argued by the Estate of Mrs. Mills in its suit did it raise the specter
of liability to third persons under state law. 158 Before addressing
those arguable insufficiencies, however, the facts in the case
should be considered.

A. The Factual Scenario Underlying the Decision in
Fleming v. Vest

154. Id. at 572, 89 S.W.3d at 339.
155. Jean-Pierre, 350 Ark. at 572, 89 S.W.3d at 339.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 573, 89 S.W.3d at 339. Perhaps ironically, the patient’s name was
“Haywood Wilder.” Id. at 572, 89 S.W.3d at 338.
158. Id. at 572, 89 S.W.3d at 339.
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The murder underlying the lawsuit against Dr. Vest was
committed by the psychiatrist’s patient, Lands, resulting in the
death of Fleming when Lands shot him on April 19, 2010.159
Fleming’s wife, Jane, filed suit as personal representative of his
estate, alleging that Dr. Vest was negligent in his treatment of
Lands, who had been acquitted years earlier based on impaired
mental state, and as an insanity acquittee, Lands was effectively
in custody of the Arkansas State Hospital following the acquittal,
eventually being released from in-patient treatment on a five-year
conditional release. 160 His treatment had been transferred to
Garland County Counseling Services with Dr. Vest assuming
responsibility for Fleming’s treatment. 161 The majority then
explained Fleming’s treatment:
There he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and began
treatment. In 2009, appellee became his treating psychiatrist
and, in order to determine the appropriate medication
regimen, began to withdraw the level of pharmaceuticals
administered to Lands. The final time appellee met with
Lands before the death of Scott Fleming was on February 24,
2010. 162

Although Fleming v. Vest arises in the context of a third
person’s death caused by a mental patient which the plaintiff
alleged resulted from the therapist’s negligence, the theory of
negligence is significantly different than that asserted in Tarasoff.
There was no claimed breach of duty based on the patient’s threat
and, in fact, the opinion does not even suggest that Dr. Vest knew
of Scott Fleming or any relationship between Fleming and his
patient, Lands, that would have required him to warn Fleming of
Lands’ propensity for violence.

B. The Court’s Holding and Split in Thinking Among
the Panel Judges
At the outset, the theory of negligence upon which Fleming’s
claim against Dr. Vest was based is broader than that addressed
159.
160.
161.
162.

Fleming v. Vest, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 1, 475 S.W.3d 576, 578.
Id. at 1-2, 475 S.W.3d at 576, 578.
Id. at 2, 475 S.W.3d at 578.
Id.
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in Tarasoff. It reflects an important departure from Tarasoff and
related cases in which the foreseeability question is paramount
because it is the injury to the third person, whether based on the
patient’s disclosed victims in the context of threats, or on the
injudicious release of the patient hospitalized for treatment that
triggers liability.
The question of the psychiatrist’s liability would not
necessarily arise because any other person suffered an injury. The
patient, Lands, could himself have had a cause of action based
upon Dr. Vest’s diagnostic strategy in reducing his medications if
that practice were, itself, a departure from the recognized standard
of care and he could demonstrate injury as a result. But in the
factual context in which Tarasoff and cases in which the
premature release from hospitalization provides the basis for the
negligence claim, it is the injury to someone other than the patient
upon which the negligence claim rests. 163

1. The Issue Before the Appellate Court
As the court briefly summarized, Fleming’s Estate claimed
that Dr. Vest’s treatment decisions, including the reduction in
pharmaceuticals, were responsible for his patient’s act in killing
Fleming. 164 That this was the basis for the negligence claim is
important in the context of the case. It goes to the heart of the
physician’s standard of care because it addresses the mental
health professional’s primary obligation toward the patient—to
engage in an acceptable course of action in treatment designed to
cure or address the symptoms of the patient’s mental illness or
impairment. 165 In Tarasoff and in the institutional discharge
cases, negligence may be found based on a failure to consider
what might otherwise be viewed as unforeseen consequences of a

163. See Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 340 (“When a therapist determines, or pursuant to
the standards of his profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of
violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended
victim against such danger.”).
164. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 5, 475 S.W.3d at 580.
165. See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, APA COMMENTARY ON ETHICS IN
PRACTICE
2
(2015),
https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/ethics
[https://perma.cc/U6KV-RUPE] (noting that “[t]he physician-patient relationship is the
cornerstone of psychiatric practice, and its goal is to promote patient health and wellbeing.”).
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breach of the standard of care. 166 Liability rests on the
proposition that for the mental health professional, such
consequences are not unforeseen under the circumstances. 167
In contrast, the triggering factor for foreseeability analysis in
Tarasoff is the patient’s violent threat disclosed in the course of
evaluation or treatment. 168 Similarly, with respect to the
injudicious discharge of an involuntarily committed patient for
treatment, the dangerousness factor is implicit because
involuntary civil commitment itself is dependent on proof of
some dangerousness and not simply mental illness or other
disorder. 169
But specifically, the disposition of the negligence theory
asserted by Fleming’s estate was not the primary question
considered by the court of appeals. Instead, the issue that led to
the trial court granting summary judgment was primarily whether
the plaintiff had brought their action against Dr. Vest within the
required period of time or was barred by the application of the
statute of limitations. 170 Typically, an action for negligence
brought in an Arkansas court must be commenced within the three
year period of limitations prescribed by statute. 171 But in the case
of a claim based upon negligence on the part of a professional
covered by the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, 172 the time
period is shorter, and the action must be brought within two
years. 173
166. See, e.g., Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887, 896 (Ala. 2004) (holding the director
of a methadone-treatment center owed a duty not to discharge patients under the influence
of liquid methadone when it was foreseeable that the patient would be operating a motor
vehicle).
167. See id. at 892 (explaining that the risk of a motor vehicle accident was entirely
foreseeable to the director of the methadone-treatment center).
168. Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 345.
169. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207(c)
(2014) (“A person shall be eligible for involuntary admission if he or she is in such a mental
condition as a result of mental illness, disease, or disorder that he or she poses a clear and
present danger to himself or herself or others.”) (emphasis added).
170. Fleming v. Vest, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 2-3, 475 S.W.3d 576, 578.
171. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-105 (2005).
172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-201(1) (Supp. 2015) (“Action for medical injury”
means all actions against a medical care provider, whether based in tort, contract, or
otherwise, to recover damages on account of medical injury as defined in this section.”).
173. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203(a) (2006); see Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352,
361-62, 208 S.W.3d 162, 167-68 (2005) (holding that two year limitations period under
malpractice statute controls over three year limitations period provided in Wrongful Death
Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102(c) (Supp. 2015), when medical negligence is alleged as
the cause of death).
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Fleming’s Estate initially brought suit against Lands,
Community Counseling Services, and CCS’s insurer on August
16, 2010, 174 adding Dr. Vest as a defendant on April 19, 2011,
two years after Fleming’s death. 175 The action was brought under
the state’s wrongful death statute. 176 The limitations problem
arose because Dr. Vest had last met with Lands as his treating
psychiatrist on February 24, 2010. 177 That is, if the two year
limitations period applicable to medical malpractice actions
proved controlling, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Dr. Vest was correct and the Estate’s claim against him
personally was time-barred.
The key to the limitations issue was whether the Estate’s
claim against Dr. Vest rested on medical malpractice, or on the
broader theory of negligence that underlies the statutory action
for wrongful death. The Medical Malpractice Act has a specific
provision that applies:
“Medical injury” or “injury” means any adverse
consequences arising out of or sustained in the course of the
professional services being rendered by a medical care
provider to a patient or resident, whether resulting from
negligence, error, or omission in the performance of such
services; or from rendition of such services without informed
consent or in breach of warranty or in violation of contract;
or from failure to diagnose; or from premature abandonment
of a patient or of a course of treatment; or from failure to
properly maintain equipment or appliances necessary to the
rendition of such services; or otherwise arising out of or
sustained in the course of such services. 178

This phrasing in the statutory definition, “any adverse
consequences,” is the source of some confusion as to what the
General Assembly may actually have intended, although it may
well lead properly to the conclusion that liability to third persons
is included whenever they suffer adverse consequences arising
from the professional services of “medical providers,” a term also

174. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 2, 475 S.W.3d at 578.
175. Id. at 2, 475 S.W.3d at 578.
176. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102(c) (Repl. 2006) (three year limitation for wrongful
death suits).
177. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 2, 475 S.W.3d at 578.
178. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-201(3) (2006).
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defined by the statute 179 that includes mental health
professionals. 180 The inclusion of the word “any” in the phrase
any adverse consequences would provide the definitional
lynchpin to an argument that liability for professional negligence
in diagnosis and treatment runs beyond any injury or consequence
sustained by the medical provider’s patient.
Although the disposition of the liability issue by the
Arkansas Court of Appeals recognizes that mental health
professionals may be held liable for foreseeable injuries caused to
third persons by their patients, 181 the majority and concurring
opinions in the case reflect far different approaches to resolving
questions about the nature of liability. Both Judge Brown’s
majority opinion, joined by Judge Abrahamson, and Judge
Harrison’s concurring opinion rest on the acceptance of imposing
liability on the mental health professional for negligence,
generally. 182 However, the two opinions reflect far different
approaches to the source of liability governing the action for
Fleming’s death.

a. The Majority Opinion
Judges Brown and Abrahamson found that the negligence
theory urged linking Fleming’s death to Dr. Vest’s diagnostic
protocol squarely placed the action within the ambit of the
Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act. 183 They relied on the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Dodson v. Charter
179. The statute defines medical care provider to include virtually the entire range of
treating professionals and treating institutions:
“Medical care provider” means a physician, certified registered nurse
anesthetist, physician’s assistant, nurse, optometrist, chiropractor, physical
therapist, dentist, podiatrist, pharmacist, veterinarian, hospital, nursing home,
community mental health center, psychologist, clinic, or not-for-profit home
health care agency licensed by the state or otherwise lawfully providing
professional medical care or services, or an officer, employee or agent thereof
acting in the course and scope of employment in the providing of such medical
care or medical services.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-201(2) (2006).
180. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-45-201(4) (2014) (“‘Mental health services provider’
means a licensed certified social worker, licensed marriage and family therapist, licensed
professional counselor, physician, psychologist, or registered nurse who provides mental
health services.”).
181. See Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 5, 475 S.W.3d at 580.
182. Id. at 10-11, 475 S.W.3d at 582-83 (Harrison, J., concurring) (noting that the
liability of the doctor should turn on a theory of a duty owed to the non-patient third-party).
183. Id. at 5, 475 S.W.3d at 580.
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Behavioral Health Sys. of N.W. Ark., Inc., 184 where the court held
that the fatality and injury sustained by the two plaintiffs, Drain
and Dodson respectively, as a result of a traffic accident involving
a psychiatric patient fell within the scope of professional
negligence:
[The patient had been an] in-patient at Charter Vista Hospital
in Fayetteville. Her diagnosis was severe depression, and
she was placed on a suicide watch. According to a
Psychiatric Evaluation completed by Dr. Stephen Dollins on
March 9, 1994, she had suicidal ideations with a plan of
driving in front of a truck to make her death look like an
accident. 185

In what is, again, a procedurally complex case, the supreme
court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument on appeal that the case
involved only an allegation of ordinary negligence based on the
negligence of the patient in causing the fatal accident, observing,
“Medical negligence permeates this case,” 186 and later, “failure to
diagnose Harrison as suicidal and to provide proper services to
prevent her death lay at the heart of the appellants’ cause of
action.” 187
The accident killing Drain and injuring Dodson occurred
while the patient was en route to Charter Vista to obtain treatment
following a call made to a Charter Vista Mobile Assessment
Team employee, Minkel, in which the patient reported suicidal
thoughts resulting in an aborted attempt. 188 Minkel assessed the
seriousness of the patient’s intent and, finding her rational,
advised her to drive to the hospital for treatment, an approach with
which the treating psychiatrist agreed. 189 The patient’s death in
the automobile accident was ruled a suicide. 190
Prior to trial, the plaintiffs dismissed their complaint against
the treating psychiatrist without prejudice. 191 At trial, the trial
court granted a directed verdict in favor of Charter, finding that
184. 335 Ark. 96, 983 S.W.2d 98 (1998).
185. Id. at 99, 983 S.W.2d at 100.
186. Id. at 102-03, 983 S.W.2d at 102 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the case
was only one of ordinary negligence because every allegation against the defendant
“centered on a breakdown in medical care between the hospital and its patient.”).
187. Id. at 104, 983 S.W.2d at 102.
188. Id.
189. Dodson, 335 Ark. at 100-01, 983 S.W.2d at 101.
190. Id. at 101, 983 S.W.2d at 101.
191. Id.
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the trial evidence did not establish negligence on the part of its
employee, Minkel, having earlier rejected Charter’s argument
that it owed no duty to its patient based on her suicide. 192 This
means that the trial court found that Charter Vista did owe a duty
to the third persons killed and injured in their patient’s suicidal
accident—the suicide finding as to cause of death establishing
that her action was intentional and not the result of such
negligence that it would not have been foreseeable—based on
knowledge of her impaired mental state. 193
However, the supreme court did not reach an ultimate
question regarding duty to third persons, 194 upholding the trial
court’s directed verdict based on its conclusion that the testimony
offered by the plaintiff’s expert witness failed to establish that
either the treating psychiatrist or Charter Vista MAT employee,
Minkel, breached a duty of care in their treatment of the patient.195
Without expert opinion that there had been a breach of the
standard of care, the jury could not have returned a verdict
reflecting a finding of malpractice, or professional negligence,
rendering the issue of the scope of the medical provider’s duty to
the accident victims moot. 196
Nevertheless, Dodson certainly implies that the standard of
care would include the duty to protect third persons from
foreseeable injuries and Judge Brown’s majority opinion rests
comfortably on this assumption based on the court’s explicit
finding that the claim brought by Dodson was governed by the
Medical Malpractice Act. 197
Summarizing the specific
allegations of deficient performance by Charter Vista that the
plaintiffs had included in their complaint, the supreme court
explained, “All of these allegations are centered on a breakdown
in medical care between the hospital and its patient.” 198
Once the majority concluded that the case was governed by
the malpractice statute, the two-year statute of limitations would
have appeared to preclude recovery on the claim against Dr. Vest
192. Id. at 99-102, 983 S.W.2d at 100-01.
193. Id. at 101-03, 983 S.W.2d at 101-02.
194. Dodson, 335 Ark. at 103, 983 S.W.2d at 102 (“The trial court found that there
was a special relationship and that a duty was owed, but we do not view that finding as
determinative of whether this is a medical negligence case.”).
195. Id. at 102-04, 983 S.W.2d at 100-01.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 102-03, 983 S.W.2d at 102.
198. Id. at 103, 983 S.W.2d at 102.
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asserted more than two years after Fleming’s death. But the
majority relied on an exception to the strict application of a twoyear term for filing when the medical provider has engaged in a
“continu[ous] course of treatment” for the patient. 199 The
majority relied on the supreme court’s explanation of this
approach, which predated adoption of the Medical Malpractice
Act, in Tullock v. Eck. 200 In Tullock, the court explained the
“continuous treatment” doctrine relied on Arkansas medical
malpractice actions following adoption of the Medical
Malpractice Act:
In contrast to the so-called continuing tort theory, based on
a single negligent act with on-going injury, the continuous
treatment doctrine becomes relevant when the medical
negligence consists of a negligent act, followed by a
continuing course of treatment for the malady which was the
object of the negligent treatment or act. 201

In distinguishing the two theories, “continuing tort,” and
“continuous treatment,” the court explained that the former was
predicated on proof that the physician’s negligence resulting in an
ongoing injury, such as a misdiagnosis followed by cancer, would
permit assertion of the negligence claim only after discovery of
the injury by the patient. 202 Application of continuing tort theory
would have imposed a discovery rule for triggering the limitations
period, which the court found inconsistent with the legislative
intent in the adoption of the Medical Malpractice Act and its two
year limitations period. 203
Judges Brown and Abrahamson concluded that the
“continuous treatment” rule applied to Fleming’s Estate’s claim
against Dr. Vest based on the fact that the psychiatrist continued
to monitor Lands during the reduction in his medications
following the February, 2010, visit; that Dr. Vest had no intention
of abandoning his patient; and, in fact, had scheduled an
appointment for Lands sometime after April 21, 2010. 204 This
evidence led the majority to find that Dr. Vest could be found to
199. Fleming v. Vest, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 7 n.13, 475 S.W.3d 576, 581 n.13 (citing
Tullock v. Eck, 311 Ark. 564, 570, 845 S.W.2d 517, 521 (1993)).
200. Id. at 569-71, 845 S.W.2d at 520-21.
201. Id. at 570, 845 S.W.2d at 521.
202. Id. at 569-70, 845 S.W.2d at 520-21.
203. Id.
204. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 8, 475 S.W.3d at 582.
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still be engaged in treatment of Lands after that date—critical for
application of the limitations period governing the Fleming
claim—in holding that the claim was not barred by the
malpractice statute’s two-year statute of limitations. They
pointed out, however, that the issue of continuous treatment was
an unresolved factual issue that had to be resolved by the jury at
trial. 205
Perhaps, ironically, the majority opinion appears to have
glossed over some of the elements of the malpractice claim most
important to mental health professionals. The irony lies in the
fact that the majority must have realized how dramatic its decision
might prove to be in expanding tort liability for a major group of
medical professionals, yet issued an opinion supporting that
expansion without addressing core issues facing those
professionals and their necessary understanding of an additional
duty to be imposed upon practice decisions.
For example, this is not strictly a Tarasoff claim because it
did not involve a failure to warn the third person allegedly injured
due to the psychiatrist’s negligence. There was no evidence
referenced in the majority opinion that Lands threatened Fleming
or anyone else, or even expressed any particular hostility toward
others. One would have expected the majority to explain how the
foreseeability requirement—the heart of a tort action—could be
demonstrated based on the evidence developed in the trial court.
If the record included such evidence, the majority failed, whether
deliberately or inadvertently, to reference it in the opinion.
In the absence of some proof that Dr. Vest could reasonably
have been expected to anticipate that his patient would engage in
violence toward any third person, the majority almost suggests
that foreseeability is not implicit in any duty imposed upon the
treating mental health professional. Without evidence of
knowledge of a patient’s propensity to engage in violence, or
disclosure of an intended victim, a departure from proof of
foreseeability threatens imposing liability strictly, 206 without any
showing of negligence on the part of the mental health
professional.

205. Id. at 8, 475 S.W.3d at 582.
206. Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D. Colo.) (noting that imposition of
liability without consideration of foreseeability of the patient’s violent actions would result
in a duty exposing the mental health professional to strict liability, without proof of fault).
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b. The Concurring Opinion
Judge Harrison’s concurring opinion in Fleming v. Vest207
reflects a dramatic departure from the majority with respect to the
fundamental question of whether the negligence claim should be
viewed as governed by the Medical Malpractice Act, in which
event the two year limitations issue was critical to the ability of
the plaintiff to sustain its claim. In contrast to the majority, he
concluded that the claim did not involve medical malpractice at
all and should not be governed by the Act. Consequently, he
argued that the two year limitations period mandated for medical
malpractice claims did not apply and, thus, the Estate’s filing
against Dr. Vest was timely, falling within the three year
limitations generally applicable in Arkansas tort actions. 208 Judge
Harrison wrote an analysis of the claim:
This case is not one for medical malpractice because it does
not truly probe whether Dr. Vest properly treated a person
with whom he had a doctor-patient relationship. This case
turns, at least in part, on whether Dr. Vest owed a legal duty
to control or confine patient Lands so as to protect Fleming,
who was not a patient. That strikes me as being a
fundamentally different question that needs an analytical
framework apart from the Act. 209

In finding that the fatal injury inflicted by Lands, the patient,
was not an “adverse consequence” of the treatment rendered by
Dr. Vest, Judge Harrison observed that this characterization
would expand the concept of liability for malpractice too far, that
“[e]very legal concept should have its practical limit.” 210 He
argued his point even further:
A troublesome point with applying the Medical Malpractice
Act in this case is that the shooting itself must arguably be
the actionable “adverse consequence.” Because until Lands
shot Fleming, the latter man was not “injured” by Dr. Vest’s
treatment of Lands. Yet how can the violent, intentional act
that Lands committed against Fleming equate to a medical
injury? To so conclude injects a legal fiction into an area of
207. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 10-14, 475 S.W.3d at 583-85 (Harrison, J.,
concurring).
208. Id. at 10, 475 S.W.3d at 583.
209. Id. at 11, 475 S.W.3d at 583.
210. Id.
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the law where one is not needed to carry out the general
assembly’s intent, in real-world affairs. The law of
unintended consequences may have just been triggered.
Applying the Act in a case like this one arguably undermines
the general assembly’s main reason for promulgating the
Act, because it seems to expand the potential tort liability
that medical-care providers could face. 211

He then resurrected the still-viable decision in Chatman v.
Millis 212 to argue that medical malpractice claims should be
“tether[ed]” to the provider/patient relationship, and relied on the
court of appeal’s holding in Thompson v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
issued in 2009. 213
In Thompson, however, the court of appeals considered a
claim based on the defendant Sparks’ refusal to admit the plaintiff
for emergency treatment because she had previously been
admitted at another hospital, St. Edward Mercy Medical Center,
which did not have a plastic surgeon available on call to treat the
patient’s injuries. 214 Plaintiff then sought treatment at Sparks,
which did have a plastic surgeon on call; 215 the surgeon refused
to treat the plaintiff because she had already been admitted at St.
Edwards where he had lost his privileges and was, thus, unable to
treat her there. 216 When plaintiff’s father sought to have Sparks
agree to admit her for treatment, he was advised by a nurse that
she did not authority to admit a patient, nor to require a physician
to treat a patient. 217 She did, however, advise the father that if the
plaintiff presented at the Sparks’ emergency room, she would be
treated, but the plaintiff never sought admission at Sparks through
the emergency room. She was eventually treated at St.
Edwards. 218
The plaintiff sued Sparks under the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act for refusal to admit her as a

211. Id. at 11, 475 S.W.3d at 583-84.
212. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 13, 475 S.W.3d at 584 (citing Chatman v. Millis,
257 Ark. 451, 453, 517 S.W.2d 504, 505 (1975)).
213. Id. (citing Thompson v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2009 Ark. App. 190, at 5, 302
S.W.2d 35, 38).
214. Thompson, 2009 Ark. App 190, at 1-2, 302 S.W.3d at 36.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2, 302 S.W.3d at 36.
218. Id.
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patient 219 and also claimed recovery under the Medical
Malpractice Act. 220 The court of appeals concluded that she could
not sustain an action for malpractice against Sparks, explaining,
“Because it is undisputed that Sparks never provided
‘professional services,’ the plain reading of the statute does not
impose liability on it for Thompson’s alleged injuries.” 221
Thompson v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr. is factually dissimilar
from the claim urged in Fleming v. Vest. Despite the broad
interpretation of the Medical Malpractice Act with regard to
liability of medical providers, its language cannot be reconciled
with an absence of any treatment by a provider whatsoever. The
key provision defines “medical injury” or “injury” as “any
adverse consequences” resulting from “negligence, error or
omission” in provision of medical services; violation of informed
consent; failure to properly diagnose; premature abandonment of
a patient; failure to maintain equipment used in delivery of
medical services; or “otherwise arising out of or sustained in the
course of such services.” 222 Thompson’s could not reasonably
arise from any definition of “medical injury” under the statute.
Judge Harrison, thus, argued that Fleming’s claim would fail
under the Medical Malpractice Act essentially because it did not
result from an injury he sustained as a patient. 223 But, in contrast
to the facts in Thompson, it did rest precisely on an allegation of
“error, negligence or omission” on Dr. Vest’s part in reducing his
patient’s medication for diagnostic and treatment purposes.
Consistent with subsection (3), 224 the treatment decision
might have permitted recovery for Fleming’s “injury” based on
any of several bases for liability: whether there was error in
undertaking this approach for an outpatient not subject to
continuing observation; whether there was negligence in failing
to appreciate possible risk that withdrawal of medication might
219. Thompson, 2009 Ark. App 190, at 1, 3-4, 302 S.W.3d at 37-38 (holding that
plaintiff could not sustain her action under the Act, commonly referred to as the “antidumping statute” that prevents hospitals from refusing to treat or accept transfer of a patient
needing the special services available at the transferee institution. She was offered the option
of admission through the Sparks emergency room, but did not avail herself of this option,
remaining at St. Edward for treatment.).
220. Id. at 5-6, 302 S.W.3d at 38.
221. Id. at 6, 302 S.W.3d at 38.
222. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-201(3) (Supp. 2015). For complete text of subsection
(3), see supra note 178.
223. Fleming v. Vest, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 2, 475 S.W.3d 576, 578.
224. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-201(3) (Supp. 2015).
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lead to patient becoming violent; or whether there was omission
in failing to more carefully or regularly monitor the patient’s
progress and possible symptoms during the period of withdrawal
of decrease or withdrawal of medication. 225
The negligence allegation in Fleming v. Vest was rooted in
the claim that the decision to reduce medication for Lands led to
Fleming’s fatal injury, as the majority explained, “in order to
determine the appropriate medication regimen, [Dr. Vest] began
to withdraw the level of pharmaceuticals administered to
Lands.” 226 Without the reference to the professional relationship
between Lands and Dr. Vest, there could be no duty on the part
of Dr. Vest to protect Fleming in any sense because there is no
general duty to prevent anyone else from injuring a third person—
the exceptions being when there is a special relationship between
the actor and person causing the injury to the third person or the
actor assumes the responsibility for protecting the third person. 227
Nothing in the facts related by either the majority or concurring
judges would have established the element of duty required to
support a claim of negligence.
Judge Harrison’s reference to the law of unintended
consequences might not only have reflected his concern that the
majority’s approach unreasonably expanded the language of the
Malpractice Act beyond the General Assembly’s intent in
adopting, but a recognition that responsibility for Fleming’s death
simply could not be placed on Dr. Vest on the record before the
trial court when it granted summary judgment.
In invoking Tarasoff as authority on the question of the
scope of duty imposed by law on mental health professionals,
Judge Harrison did not discuss the rather significant factual
contexts in which Tarasoff and Fleming v. Vest respectively
arose. Of critical importance is that Tarasoff responded to a
situation in which the therapist had actual knowledge of the
patient’s threats directed at a known potential victim, his
estranged girlfriend. 228 In Fleming, however, the theory of
liability does not rest on the therapist’s failure to warn an
225. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-201(3).
226. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 2, 475 S.W.3d at 578, 580 (“Here, the allegation
was that Scott Fleming’s death occurred because of the professional services (or lack thereof)
being provided to Samuel Lands by appellee.”).
227. Id. at 13, 475 S.W.3d at 584.
228. Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 341.
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identified victim, but rather on the random act of the psychiatric
patient resulting in the murder of an unidentified victim based on
an alleged defect in practice constituting negligence. 229
To hold Dr. Vest accountable, it would be necessary to adopt
the duty to warn the public generally, not limiting the mental
health provider’s responsibility to situations in which the patient
is known to threaten a prospective, identifiable victim. This was
the general duty to protect the public that the Iowa Supreme Court
had rejected in Leonard. 230 Judge Harrison clearly opposes the
use of the Medical Malpractice Act to expand liability of
physicians and, in this case, mental health providers, as evidenced
by his concluding remarks arguing that the case should be
remanded to the trial court for consideration of the liability of Dr.
Vest as a matter of negligence generally:
I express no opinion on the merits of the complaint, nor
whether a duty in tort exists. My point here is solely that the
Medical Malpractice Act—and the law that goes hand-inglove with it—does not apply. So I would not apply the
Act’s two-year limitations period or the continuoustreatment doctrine. It also means that the circuit court should
be directed to address, as a matter of law, whether a tortbased duty runs from Dr.Vest to Fleming apart from the Act.
How it would determine whether a duty exists apart from the
Act is for the parties to argue and the circuit court to
decide. 231

Remanding for the trial court to determine whether the injury
to Fleming could properly provide the basis for liability beyond
the ambit of the Medical Malpractice Act would necessarily have
further delayed any final resolution of the contested issue. The
problem lies in the fact that the Act does broaden the theory of
provider liability in the use of the phrase “any adverse
consequences.” Despite Judge Harrison’s point that the state
supreme court’s decision in Dodson v. Charter Vista did not have
a “clear holding” 232 that would govern Fleming’s Estate’s claim,
229. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 5, 475 S.W.3d at 580.
230. Leonard v. State, 491 N.W.2d 508, 512 (Iowa 1992).
231. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 14, 475 S.W.3d at 585.
232. Id. at 11, 475 S.W.3d at 583. The Dodson court had declined to embrace the trial
court’s finding that Charter Vista owed a duty to the plaintiff based on the special relationship
with their patient and that the duty to the third party was owed by Charter for the acts of their
patient. Dodson, 335 Ark. at 103, 983 S.W.2d at 102.
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the court’s disposition did not include any express rejection of the
Medical Malpractice Act as the basis for liability that one might
have expected if the intent of the General Assembly was clearly
to limit physician liability with respect to third persons, as
opposed to patients. 233

C. The Complex Procedural Context
Judge Harrison characterized, and quite artfully explained,
the issues before the court in Fleming v. Vest:
This case brings Arkansas to an important judicial
crossroads: will our courts continue to expand the Act’s
definition of what constitutes a “medical injury” and thus
pull more providers into the Act’s orbit? Or will they begin
taking a more nuanced approach, especially in cases where a
medical-care provider’s patient commits an intentional harm
upon a third person, and more carefully analyze whether a
provider can be sued in tort at all? 234

The case arose in the context of an appeal to the Arkansas
Court of Appeals from the trial court’s decision granting
summary judgment to the defendant, rather than from a verdict
rendered by a jury or trial court having heard the case fully on the
merits. 235 As a consequence, the decision rendered by the panel
of the court of appeals, an intermediate appellate court, must be
viewed in light of the procedural consequences of disposition by
summary judgment, rather than following a trial on the merits,
and the limited appellate review involved in considering the trial
court’s action in granting judgment for the defendant
summarily. 236

1. The Unaddressed Issue of Proximate Cause
The majority opinion by Judge Brown did not address the
ultimate question for a negligence determination, whether the
actions of the defendant were the proximate cause of the fatal
injury suffered by Fleming. The court of appeals, in an earlier
case alleging medical malpractice, Dodd v. Sparks Reg’l Med.

233.
234.
235.
236.

Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 5, 475 S.W.3d at 580.
Id. at 14, 475 S.W.3d at 584-85.
Id. at 1, 475 S.W.3d at 578.
Id. at 3, 475 S.W.3d at 578-79.
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Ctr., 237 had upheld the trial court’s judgment for defendant
physicians based on the plaintiff’s claim that they had been
negligent in essentially failing to prevent the suicide of their
patient. 238 The plaintiff had been unable to offer expert testimony
that the physician defendants were negligent in their diagnosis or
treatment of the patient, and the court held, “In malpractice cases,
a defendant is entitled to summary judgment when it is shown that
the plaintiff has no qualified expert to testify as to the applicable
standard of care.” 239
The Dodd court also found that the evidence was insufficient
to support a claim based on ordinary, instead of medical,
negligence based on the defendant hospital’s failure to remove a
different door stop in the patient rooms because patient’s suicide
was committed by hanging herself after being able to close the
door using the stop. 240 The expert testimony offered by a nursing
supervisor and a nurse explained that suicidal individuals seek
privacy to facilitate commission of their acts and had the nurse
known the doorstop had been left in the patient’s room, she would
have removed it. 241
Despite the expert testimony, the Dodd court ruled that the
evidence was insufficient to establish that any failure to remove
the doorstop was the proximate cause for the patient’s suicide. 242
The court explained its ruling:
Proximate cause is that which in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the result would not
have occurred. This traditional tort standard requires proof
that “but for” the tortfeasor’s negligence, the plaintiff’s
injury or death would not have occurred. Proximate
causation becomes a question of law if reasonable minds
could not differ as to the result. As applied here, it was
appellant’s burden to demonstrate that the removal of the
door-stop would have prevented Ms. Dodd from committing
suicide. 243

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

90 Ark. App. 191, 196, 204 S.W.3d 579, 582 (2005).
Id. at 200, 204 S.W.3d at 585.
Id. at 198, 204 S.W.3d at 584.
Id. at 200, 204 S.W.3d at 584.
Id.
Dodson, 90 Ark. App. at 200, 204 S.W.3d at 585.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Thus, even though Dr. Vest’s medication reduction decision
might have been characterized as constituting negligent practice
or deviation from the accepted standard of care, expert opinion on
that issue did not necessarily demonstrate that his patient, Lands,
would not have killed Fleming “but-for” the psychiatrist’s
diagnostic strategy. Certainly, Lands could have simply stopped
taking any medication as an out-patient and experienced some
psychological lapse leading to his violent act against Fleming. In
fact, as the majority noted, Lands was in the care of Dr. Vest as a
consequence of having been acquitted by reason of mental disease
or defect on charges of “battery, escape, resisting arrest, assault,
and fleeing,” suggesting a propensity for violence prior to his
hospitalization.244
Whether the action sounded in medical malpractice, as the
majority found, 245 or in ordinary negligence, as argued in the
concurrence, 246 the facts related by the court fail to demonstrate
that Fleming’s Estate could ever meet the burden imposed by the
law of establishing that Dr. Vest’s diagnostic protocol was the
proximate cause of Fleming’s death at the hands of the patient.
Judge Harrison was explicit in preferring to remand the case to
the trial court for resolution of this issue, 247 while the majority
proceeded on the impact of the limitations period on the claim
depending on whether it was governed by the Medical
Malpractice Act or ordinary negligence principles. 248
The decision of the court of appeals in failing to address even
the possibility that Fleming’s Estate could meet its burden of
proving proximate cause on the state of the record on appeal,
leaves open a major unanswered question on the facts of this case.
This is not Tarasoff, resting on evidence of a disclosed threat and
identified victim, but a case of unforeseen consequences.
Whether the treating psychiatrist could ever be held liable in such
circumstances remains an important, unresolved issue, likely to
spill over into many situations in which mental health providers
are required to make diagnostic decisions that could, in theory or
abstractly, render them liable for damages—liable for damages
they did not cause directly, but were caused by their patients.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Fleming v. Vest, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 1-2, 475 S.W.3d 576, 578.
Id. at 5, 457 S.W.3d at 580.
Id. at 14, 457 S.W.3d at 585 (Harrison, J., concurring).
Id. at 14, 457 S.W.3d at 585.
Id. at 5, 457 S.W.3d at 580.
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2. The Questionable Precedential Value of the Panel
Decision
Briefly, the problems posed by the parameters of the
decision in Vest are apparent, not the least being that the decision
represents the analysis of only a three judge panel of the Arkansas
Court of Appeals 249 rather than a seminal statement offered by the
Arkansas Supreme Court, the court of last resort in the state. 250
Because the intermediate appellate court’s decision was not tested
by petition for review in the supreme court 251 or by certification
by the lower court on an important novel interpretation of
Arkansas law, 252 it is not as forceful as it would be had it been the
decision of the supreme court.
It is the supreme court, of course, that almost always engages
in decision-making that reflects a major shift in state law by the
judicial branch. 253 For example, the state supreme court
announced such a shift in law in Aka v. Jefferson Cty. Hosp.
Ass’n, 254 holding that a fetus is a “person” within the meaning of
the Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute, 255 and overruling its prior
precedent in Chatalain v. Kelley. 256 The court exercised its
jurisdiction on certification by the court of appeals based on the
importance of the issue as a matter of first impression,257
extending liability of medical professionals to include negligence
resulting in death during the delivery of a baby whose death was
249. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 1, 10, 475 S.W.3d at 576-77.
250. See Foster v. Hill, 372 Ark. 263, 267, 275 S.W.3d 151, 155 (2008) (discussing
the court’s inherent superintendent control over lower courts, enabled so that the court can
“fulfill its role as the court of last resort in the state.”).
251. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4(c) (authorizing a litigant to petition for review by the
supreme court of a decision rendered by the court of appeals where an issue meets the test of
Rule 1-2(b) setting forth the jurisdiction of the state supreme court, including, inter alia; “(1)
issues of first impression . . . (4) issues of substantial public interest, [and] (5) significant
issues needing clarification or development of the law, or overruling of precedent . . . .”).
252. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(d) (authorizing the court of appeals to certify a case to the
state supreme court for review on direct appeal when the case “involves an issue of
significant public interest or a legal principle of major importance”).
253. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 638, 80 S.W.3d 332, 353-54 (2002)
(recognizing a person’s right to engage in consensual, adult, homosexual activity under the
Arkansas Constitution, precluding criminal prosecution for sodomy).
254. 344 Ark. 627, 641-42, 42 S.W.3d 508, 517-18 (2001).
255. Id. at 640, 42 S.W.3d at 516; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102 (Supp. 2015).
256. 322 Ark. 517, 525, 910 S.W.2d 215, 219 (1995).
257. Aka, 344 Ark. at 633, 42 S.W.3d at 512 (“The Court of Appeals certified this
first-impression case for us to consider appellant’s arguments urging the reversal of
precedent.”).
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claimed to have been caused by various failures on the part of the
obstetrician and other physicians. 258 Of particular importance to
physicians and litigants in other cases, the Aka Court made its new
rule overruling Chatalain v. Kelley, applicable to benefit the
appellant in Aka and, prospectively, only to all cases arising after
the rule was announced in the Aka decision. 259
In contrast, in the wake of Fleming v. Vest, litigants and
practitioners do not enjoy the degree of certainty that may be
relied upon when the state supreme court has rendered the key
decision determining the rights of parties in future litigation as
would have been true had the decision been issued by the state
supreme court. It is possible that the majority anticipated that its
decision would be reviewed by the supreme court and that any
deficiency in its reasoning would be corrected. That did not
happen, perhaps leaving mental health providers, patients,
litigants and counsel to wonder whether the imposition of a duty
to protect third persons without notice of who might be
reasonably expected to be within the ambit of that duty to protect
will ultimately prove to be a correct statement of professional
duty under Arkansas law. 260
258. Id. The specific claims of negligence against the physicians included
“unnecessarily inducing his wife’s labor, failing to discontinue the induction, failing to
perform a cesarean section, failing to resuscitate her or the unborn baby, and failing to obtain
informed consent.” Id. The father, as special representative of his wife and child’s estates,
also sued the hospital alleging negligence in failing to properly train and supervise the
medical staff. Id. The mother also died during the birth procedure, but potential liability
under the statute for her death was not an issue in this appeal. Id.
259. Id. at 642-43, 42 S.W.3d at 19 (explaining that the court’s policy on retroactive
application of new rules or principles was to “make the new rule applicable only to the case
at bar and to causes of action arising after the decision becomes final,” acknowledging that
“no matter how a new rule of law is applied, the benefit of the new decision is denied to
some injured persons.” Thus, other potential litigants whose claims of malpractice would
have arisen prior to the announcement of the new rule finding that a fetus is a person under
the wrongful death statute would not be able to rely on Aka to support the legal theory
underlying their claims. Otherwise, other potential defendants would have not had fair notice
of the scope of the professional duty owed in factually similar situations.).
260. Similarly, the state supreme court might view the “continuous treatment”
exception to the strict application of the two year limitations period for medical malpractice
claims differently than the majority in the court of appeals did. While reliance on the
“continuous treatment” theory was not required to address a limitations problem on the facts
of the case, it fit precisely in the factual framework in Dodson v. Charter Behavorial Health
Sys. of N.W. Ark., Inc., 335 Ark. 96, 100-01, 983 S.W.2d 98, 100-01 (1998), where the
patient’s suicidal traffic accident resulting in injury and death to third persons in another
vehicle occurred as the patient was travelling to the hospital for emergency treatment at the
direction of the mental health provider. The supreme court might distinguish Dodson based
on the vaguely referenced future appointment Lands had scheduled with Dr. Vest, in terms
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3. Review of Summary Judgment, Rather Than Trial
Verdict
Third, the decision does not, in a sense, directly address the
questions of duty or liability because they arise in the context of
summary judgment practice and rest, in significant part, on the
resolution of the procedural issue as to when the applicable statute
of limitations is triggered by a patient’s act of violence injuring a
third person. The two opinions of the court of appeals judges rest
on significantly different approaches to the resolution of the
limitations issue, rather than on any ultimate determination of the
extent of the duty mental health professionals may owe to third
persons injured as the result of patient violence.
Summary judgment practice does not serve to establish final
statements of law. 261 It is a remedy that is applied in two different
contexts relevant to the issue of professional negligence raised in
Fleming v. Vest. 262 It may serve to provide a determination by
the trial judge that regardless of the evidence that the plaintiff may
be able to develop, the jurisdiction’s legal precedents or statutory
authority simply do not afford a plaintiff a right to recover on the
legal theory presented. 263 In Fleming, the panel concluded that
Arkansas law would recognize a cause of action based on the
failure of a mental health professional to prevent injury to a third
person based on the violent propensities of a patient which were
known or should have been known by the therapist. 264
Alternatively, summary judgment may be ordered by the
trial court when the plaintiff relies on a cause of action or theory

of the proper “continuous treatment.” Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 7-8, 475 S.W.3d at
581. But, it is highly likely that the supreme court would view the factual contexts similar
in holding that Fleming’s Estate could expect to rely on “continuous treatment” to avoid the
two year limitations bar.
261. See Rohner v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 225 F.2d 272, 274 (10th Cir. 1955) (“The
intended purpose of the summary judgment provision is to enable the trial court to readily
dispose of cases on matters of law where it becomes evident no material controversy of fact
remains.”).
262. See, e.g., 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 3, 475 S.W.3d at 579.
263. For instance, in Sowders v. St. Joseph’s Mercy Health Ctr., 368 Ark. 466, 468,
247 S.W.3d 514, 516-17 (2007), the plaintiff sued for injuries suffered during her discharge
from defendant hospital while being transported by hospital employees in a wheel chair to
an automobile. The defendant was not subject to suit based on the application of the state’s
charitable immunity statute prohibiting liability for institutions protected by this doctrine.
Id. The issue before the state supreme court was an issue of law and the summary judgment
granted by the trial court was subject to review de novo on appeal. Id.
264. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 5, 475 S.W.3d at 580.
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of recovery recognized in the jurisdiction, but simply is unable to
produce sufficient evidence upon which relief could be
granted. 265 Once the plaintiff is able to produce supporting
evidence—in this case expert opinion that the defendant therapist
failed to exercise the appropriate standard of care required under
the circumstances—the plaintiff has met their burden and the case
must be decided on the merits at trial by the jury, or court, sitting
as the fact-finder in the case. 266
What the disposition in Fleming does not clarify is whether
the theory of negligence asserted, relating to the psychiatrist’s
decision to reduce medication as a diagnostic tool would
constitute a proper foundation for the negligence action. It serves
merely to show that the plaintiff was able to offer expert opinion
that Dr. Vest’s approach reflected an improper departure from the
acceptable standard of care in Arkansas practice. Thus, while the
plaintiff was able to offer evidentiary support for the negligence
claim, Arkansas courts arguably might still reject the opinion
offered in the action as definitive on the question of negligence,
just as jurors or the court could consider the expert opinion and
reject it as sufficiently probative to warrant a verdict for the
plaintiff, particularly if the plaintiff’s expert testimony is
controverted by credible expert opinion reaching the contrary
conclusion. The Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, moreover,
requires the plaintiff to offer supporting expert opinion on most
questions of standard of care and negligence. 267 The opinions in

265. “Summary judgment should only be granted when it is clear that there are no
genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. The purpose of summary judgment is not to try the issues, but to
determine whether there are any issues to be tried.” Id. at 3, 475 S.W.3d at 578.
266. Id.
267. The Plaintiff’s burden of proof:
In any action for medical injury, when the asserted negligence does not lie
within the jury’s comprehension as a matter of common knowledge, the
plaintiff shall have the burden of proving:
(1) By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of
the same specialty as the defendant, the degree of skill and learning ordinarily
possessed and used by members of the profession of the medical care provider
in good standing, engaged in the same type of practice or specialty in the
locality in which he or she practices or in a similar locality;
(2) By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of
the same specialty as the defendant that the medical care provider failed to act
in accordance with that standard; and
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Fleming do not address the scope of expert opinion offered by the
plaintiff’s expert with respect to causation with regard to
Fleming’s injury and, perhaps, any opinion in this respect would
be beyond the expertise of the expert. Even given the assessment
of risk of violence and departure from the standard of care,
without any evidence that Fleming was personally at risk of the
violent act of Lands, it would seem that an opinion on the
likelihood that a fatal injury to Fleming would be foreseeable to
the treating therapist would only amount to speculation and be
subject to objection.

IV. CONCLUSION
Arkansas mental health providers can hardly welcome
debate arising in the context of litigation over the scope of their
duty to protect third persons from the criminal or violent acts of
their patients. The court of appeals disposition in Fleming v. Vest
certainly suggests that there is sentiment for increasing the
liability of mental health professionals under the state’s Medical
Malpractice Act. 268 With respect to victim warning claims, such
as one of the theories of negligence asserted in Tarasoff, the
legislation expanding immunity for Arkansas mental health
providers who take action under Act 1212, was expressly
characterized as being designed to impose a “duty to warn” third
persons or law enforcement of the providers affirmative duty to
warn. 269 That reference to a duty to warn does not appear in the
statute, as adopted. 270
At least three theories for liability of mental health providers
may be discerned from the cases. First, Tarasoff clearly
addressed liability based on a duty to warn third persons of
potential harm based on disclosure by patients of an intention to
commit acts of violence against identified potential victims.271
(3) By means of expert testimony provided only by a qualified medical expert
that as a proximate result thereof the injured person suffered injuries that
would not otherwise have occurred.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(a)(1)-(3) (2006). The Act is consistent with prior case law
requiring expert testimony to establish standard of care in medical malpractice cases. See,
e.g., Fuller v. Starnes, 268 Ark. 476, 477-78, 597 S.W.2d 88, 88-89 (1980); Eady v. Lansford,
351 Ark. 249, 254-255, 92 S.W.3d 57, 60-61 (2002).
268. Fleming, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 4-5, 7, 9, 475 S.W.3d 576, 579-82.
269. Act 1212, 2013 Ark. Acts 4964.
270. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-45-202 (2014). For a discussion, see supra note 4.
271. Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 340.
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The extension of immunity for providers warning law
enforcement, in addition to the traditional remedy of emergency
hospitalization for involuntary commitment determinations, both
applicable under Section 20-45-202 of the Arkansas Code, 272
clearly contemplates that providers are under a duty to take action
to avert injuries to third persons when patients make credible
threats against others and perhaps to the public, generally. 273
Second, in a number of cases, an alternative theory of
liability is urged based on the claimed negligence in commitment
and discharge decisions, as the Tarasoff plaintiffs alleged. 274 To
a significant extent, liability of providers for these decisions will
be addressed by immunity afforded by state law for those
involved in emergency or involuntary commitment decisions.275
Courts have been reluctant to impose liability for discharge
decisions, particularly where imposition of liability would require
recognition of the mental health professional’s duty to the public
at large. 276
The plaintiffs in Brady v. Hopper, predicated one theory of
provider negligence on the psychiatrist’s claimed failure to seek
hospitalization to protect the third person victims of Hinckley’s
violent acts. 277 The court, however, cautioned against attempts to
impose liability based on this theory in similar cases:
In the present case, there are cogent policy reasons for
limiting the scope of the therapist’s liability. To impose upon
those in the counseling professions an ill-defined “duty to
control” would require therapists to be ultimately
responsible for the actions of their patients. Such a rule
would closely approximate a strict liability standard of care,
and therapists would be potentially liable for all harm
inflicted by persons presently or formerly under psychiatric
272. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-45-202.
273. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-45-202.
274. Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 342-44.
275. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-227 (2014). Such immunity serves to protect even
negligence, but not gross negligence, malice or bad faith when an emergency hospitalization
attempt fails, as reflected in the Tarasoff court’s reference to the emergency hospitalization
effort undertaken by Poddar’s therapists as “bungled.” See supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
276. See Leonard v. State, 491 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Iowa 1992) (“Does the duty to
refrain from negligently releasing dangerous persons from custody run from the custodian to
the public at large or only to the reasonably foreseeable victims of the patient’s dangerous
tendencies?”).
277. 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1335 (D. Colo. 1983).
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treatment. Human behavior is simply too unpredictable, and
the field of psychotherapy presently too inexact, to so greatly
expand the scope of therapists’ liability. 278

Nevertheless, failure to control claims based on failure to
seek hospitalization or improper release of confined individuals
will likely continue to prove enticing because the notion that
patient violence will be addressed most effectively if patients
remained confined in mental health facilities is superficially so
plausible. 279 However, statutory immunity necessarily limits
recovery possibility on such claims, 280 typically undertaken by
private practitioners who operate with benefit of the statutory
immunity or public practitioners who also enjoy sovereign
immunity protection or statutory immunity based upon their
employment with the state. 281
The third category of negligence claims is broader than those
based on the duty to warn a specific, identified, victim of a
patient’s threats. It centers around the failure to hospitalize or the
premature release of a violent mental patient. 282 This claim is
based on the same theory of medical malpractice defined in
Fleming v. Vest, in which the treating provider’s course of action,
in terms of diagnosis and treatment, is challenged as falling below
the standard of care recognized for their profession. 283 The
language of the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, providing
that “any adverse consequence” resulting from services rendered
by medical care providers, as designated in the statute, whether
resulting from “negligence, error, or omission in the performance
of such services” describes an extremely broad range of

278. Id. at 1339 (emphasis added).
279. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (noting one of the problems with the
assumption that confinement based on the involuntary commitment process (preemptive
confinement) will serve to protect third persons lies in the constitutional limitation that
precludes confining individuals based solely upon prediction that they are likely to engage
in violence without proof of mental disorder).
280. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-203(a) (2004).
281. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-203(a) (providing statutory immunity for state actors or
employees is likely to cover all professionals employed at the Arkansas State Hospital, the
Department of Corrections, or other public mental health providers.).
282. Fleming v. Vest, 2015 Ark. App. 636, at 5, 475 S.W.3d 576, 580.
283. Id.; see supra note 267 (setting forth the statutory requirement for proving a
violation of the standard of care for the medical professional in ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114206(a) (Supp. 2015)).
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challenges that may support a claim for injury sustained in the
diagnosis and treatment of the patient. 284
The difficulty with this third and very general approach to
malpractice for mental health professionals is that it may serve to
impose a duty that may ultimately compromise the diagnostic and
treatment decisions made by mental health professionals using the
best professional judgment in treating patients who are often
severely impaired. Recall the characterization of the plaintiffs’
claims in Brady v. Hopper, the Hinckley assassination attempt
case:
The gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint is that if Dr. Hopper
had properly performed his professional duties, he would
have controlled Hinckley’s behavior; therefore, Hinckley
would not have made the presidential assassination attempt.
Specifically, plaintiffs assert that the prescription of valium
and biofeedback therapy, coupled with the advice that
Hinckley’s parents “cut him off”, aggravated Hinckley’s
condition and actually contributed to his dangerous
propensity. Further, plaintiffs assert that Dr. Hopper should
have consulted with another psychiatrist regarding his form
of treatment, and that Dr. Hopper should have taken steps to
have Hinckley confined. Finally, plaintiffs allege that Dr.
Hopper should have warned Hinckley’s parents of their
son’s extremely dangerous condition, and that he should
have warned law enforcement officials of Hinckley’s
potential for political assassination.285

Judge Moore rejected the argument that Dr. Hopper should
be held to a standard of care in which the mental health provider’s
liability would unreasonably be expanded far beyond the
recognized capability of those professionals to foresee every
potential injury that might hypothetically be sustained by persons
other than their patients. 286 Yet, that is precisely the problem
posed in Fleming v. Vest. Even assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Vest
could reasonably be criticized for his decision to reduce his
patient’s medications in an effort to determine what the
appropriate dosage should be in light of his particular impairment,
the lack of any identifiable potential victim as a result of the
284. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-201(3) (Supp. 2015).
285. 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1335 (D. Colo. 1983).
286. Id. at 1339 (holding that injuries sustained by plaintiffs were not foreseeable and,
consequently, outside scope of psychiatrist’s duty).
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patient’s commission of a violent, criminal act, may simply be
seen as asking too much of psychiatry and the other mental health
professions.
The California decision in Tarasoff provided a starting point
for the examination of the extent or scope of therapist liability to
third persons, but its limitations have been highlighted in
subsequent cases. 287 Tarasoff itself arises from the specific facts
of the disclosed threat of violence toward an identified victim and
the resulting duty of the mental health professional aware of the
threat. 288 It does not involve fact situations that would require a
broader theory of a duty to protect against “any adverse
consequences” that might flow from negligence or error on the
part of a therapist in the treatment of a patient. Yet, the division
in analysis evident in the two opinions issued in the case focuses
directly on whether the Act should be construed liberally to
provide for liability to third persons injured by the criminal
actions of their patients. Alternatively, it may ultimately be
construed more conservatively in restricting physician liability to
only those suffering injuries reasonably foreseeable, where the
potential for injury to a third person is identified to the treating
therapist.
The question of whether liability should be expanded to
include the public generally will likely remain unresolved until a
case arises in which the mental health professional’s departure
from the acceptable standard of care or failure to act prove so
egregious that injury to even unidentifiable victims will warrant
imposition of liability. 289 But the answers to the questions left
open by the court’s decision in Fleming will not be addressed in
further litigation in the case because no appeal was taken from the
circuit court’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against Dr.
Vest for failure to state a claim for relief upon which relief could
be granted under Arkansas law. 290 In the motion to dismiss, the
defendant specifically argued the following:
Arkansas law does not impose a duty upon health
professionals to protect unidentified non-patient third parties
under the circumstances of this case. Arkansas’ statutory
287. See Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 342-46; see also Menendez v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cty.,
834 P.2d 786, 794 (Cal. 1992).
288. See Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 339-42, 343-44.
289. See infra Appendix B.
290. See supra note 149.
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law, common law precedent, and its recently codified public
policy all cut squarely against the Plaintiff’s cause of action
in this case. 291

Whether Dr. Vest’s point was well-taken awaits the
judgment of future litigation since Fleming’s Estate did not
appeal from the order dismissing the action. 292 However, with
respect to the “recent codification of public policy,” it is strongly
arguable that the broad imposition of immunity for reporting
patient threats contained in Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 20-45201 to -202 represents an expression of public policy favoring
expanded liability for injury caused by mental health patients.293
The explicit language of the House Bill reflects political
sentiment favoring expanded liability:
“AN ACT TO REQUIRE A MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES PROVIDER TO WARN A LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OF A CREDIBLE THREAT
BY A PATIENT; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
Subtitle “TO REQUIRE A MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
PROVIDER TO WARN A LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY OF A CREDIBLE THREAT BY A
PATIENT.” 294

The rather broad reading of the Medical Malpractice Act by
the majority in Fleming will necessarily require further litigation
to establish the precise parameters of the duty owed to third
persons. And that, of course, assumes that there are “precise
parameters” waiting to be discerned by the Arkansas appellate
courts.

291. Motion to Dismiss at 1, Fleming v. Vest, 2015 Ark. App. 636, 475 S.W.3d 576
(No. CV2011-164-III).
292. See Fleming v. Lands Docket Report Results, AOC PUBLIC COURT CONNECT,
https://caseinfo.aoc.arkansas.gov/cconnect/PROD/public/ck_public_qry_doct.cp_dktrpt_fr
ames?backto=P&case_id=26CV-11-164&begin_date=&end_date=
[https://perma.cc/42KD-87EM].
293. See Act 1212, 2013 Ark. Acts 4964; see also supra note 4.
294. Act 1212, 2013 Ark. Acts 4964.
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Appendix A
The states reported by the National Conference of State
Legislatures as having mandatory reporting statutes are Alabama,
Arizona (duties vary for different professions), California,
Colorado, Delaware (duties vary for different professions), Idaho,
Illinois (duties vary for different professions), Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.295
States having permissive reporting laws are Alaska,
Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii,
Kansas, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. 296 The District of Columbia also has a permissive
reporting statute. 297
The four states with no duty to report are Maine, Nevada,
North Carolina, and North Dakota. 298 The Georgia Code of
Ethics of the State Board of Examiners of Psychologists allows
discretionary disclosure of confidential information to protect the
client, psychologist, or others from harm. 299 Despite Georgia’s
lack of statutory authority, it is important to note that Georgia case
law has established that “where the course of treatment of a
mental patient involves an exercise of ‘control’ over him by a
physician who knows or should know that the patient is likely to
cause bodily harm to others, an independent duty arises from that
relationship and falls upon the physician to exercise that control
with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands
of the patient.” 300 Arizona, Delaware, and Illinois apply different
standards to different professionals. 301
Delaware law provides that mental health providers must
warn against threats to clearly identified victims as well as clearly

295. See Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn, NAT’L. CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-healthprofessionals-duty-to-warn.aspx [https://perma.cc/HT32-96TZ].
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 510-4-.02 § 4.05 (2015).
300. Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 287 S.E.2d 716, 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
301. See supra note 295.
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identified property. 302 By contrast, Maryland law provides that
mental health providers only must warn against threats against
specific victims or groups, but may do so regardless of whether
the patient’s intent to harm was expressed in speech, conduct, or
writing. 303 The states granting immunity if the mental health
professional complies with certain statutory requirements are
Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. 304
The National Conference of State Legislatures report does
not include a reference to the then-recently adopted statutory
immunity scheme provided in ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-45-201 to
-202. The General Assembly passed the bill expanding immunity
for mental health providers during its 2013 General Session.

302. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5402 (West 2016).
303. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-609 (West 2016).
304. See supra note 295.
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Appendix B
Consider, for instance, the following hypothetical and
whether the psychiatrist should be held liable for the injury
suffered by the passengers of AVIAN AIR Flight 292:
Jones, a veteran commercial airline pilot employed by
AVIAN Airways, lost his wife to a long bout with cancer a
number of years ago. He took a period of leave during the
grieving period, spending significant time working through his
grief during counseling sessions with his wife’s surviving sister,
Dr. Smith, a psychiatrist. He returned to work and was again a
highly-rated pilot with Avian until about two years ago when he
experienced a startling encounter with what he believed to be an
alien craft while on a late-night flight over the Rocky Mountains.
He reported the incident to Avian, but advised his co-pilot, a
younger person with far less seniority, to deny having witnessed
the same events. Avian pressed Jones not to discuss the reported
sighting with the press or, in fact, anyone, and began to monitor
his work carefully.
Jones, unable to shake the experience, began to suspect that
Avian would force him to retire or face the possibility of being
terminated. He sought counseling once again from his sister-inlaw, Dr. Smith, explaining to her that if he sought professional
assistance using his group insurance, Avian would use this as an
excuse to fire him. She agreed to see him on a professional, but
non-paying basis. Over the next two years, she found that he was
growing paranoid and anxious, seemingly reliving the UFO
encounter much like a PTSD episode, and also growing
increasingly suspicious of his supervisors and others at Avian. He
came to distrust the co-pilot, whom he believed Avian had
recruited to spy on him.
Dr. Smith prescribed a low dosage of an anti-anxiety drug
for Jones, suggesting that he might want to take a leave of absence
while he addressed his feelings of paranoia, but he saw this as the
worst possible option, given Avian’s plan to “silence him.” He
had begun spending large amounts of time researching UFO sites
on the internet and watching programs about UFOs on cable
television. At one point he attended a seminar on UFO-related
topics sponsored by a local group. His focus on UFO events grew
to dominate his off-hours thinking, but his performance on the job
remained superior.
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During the last few sessions with Dr. Smith, Jones expressed
concern about the UFO threat to national security, complaining
about government cover-ups and, then, claims of actual
involvement with aliens at secret military/research bases, like
Dulce, New Mexico. He told her that he believed no one would
take the UFO/alien threat seriously until a commercial liner had
actually been destroyed in flight by an unidentified entity, then
laughed and said, “Thank God that’s never happened.”
Dr. Smith was worried by her brother-in-law’s suggestion,
and then wrote a prescription for a stronger anti-anxiety agent,
advising him to take the drug in the event he experienced another
distressing incident. Subsequently, Jones flew several round trips
without incident.
Several weeks later, however, Jones was the pilot of a 747,
once again flying over the Rockies at night on AVIAN Air Flight
292. Suddenly, the jet lost altitude and crashed into the Sangre
de Christos in Northern New Mexico. The last audio message
received from Flight 292 included this:
“Unidentified object, silvery, lights. . . . strobing.
“Too close. Maybe they’ll believe me now.
“Closing.
“Oh God, it’s going to hit us . . . . Oh God, save us.”
The jet then crashed. An autopsy showed that Jones had
apparently taken a substantial quantity of the anti-anxiety drug
Dr. Smith had prescribed and it had remained in his system.
Jones had told his brother that he had seen Dr. Smith for
counseling and that he was taking psychiatric meds she had
prescribed for him. He had also told his brother about his belief
that UFOs were preparing to attack aircraft and military bases and
that he had been unable to get anyone in the government to take
his claims and evidence seriously. The brother contacted Federal
investigators almost immediately after learning of the crash. The
families of the 174 individuals who died in the crash have learned
that Jones had been in therapy with Dr. Smith and almost all have
retained counsel who have given notice to AVIAN Air of their
intent to sue.

